

Japan's Corporate Governance Code

Seeking Sustainable Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value
over the Mid- to Long-Term
(Proposed Revisions)

Explanatory Notes

■ [] :

Pink highlighted comments indicate a summary of changes including:

- Reasons for additions, deletion and other changes.
- The original place of the applicable code before being moved to a different section.
- Reasons for keeping certain provisions.
- Original places and new places of applicable code that was moved to a different section

■ [] :

Green highlights shows the changes from Material 3-1 at 2nd Meeting of the Expert Panel

Japan's Corporate Governance Code

In this Corporate Governance Code, “corporate governance” means a structure for transparent, fair, timely and decisive decision-making by companies, with due attention to the needs and perspectives of shareholders and also customers, employees and local communities.

This Corporate Governance Code establishes fundamental principles for effective corporate governance at listed companies in Japan. It is expected that the Code's appropriate implementation will contribute to the development and success of companies, investors and the Japanese economy as a whole through individual companies' self-motivated actions so as to achieve sustainable growth and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term.

[Added the Preamble using the Corporate Governance Code [Final Proposal in 2015] (Preamble) as a reference.]

Objectives of the Code

1. It is important that companies operate themselves with the full recognition of responsibilities to a range of stakeholders, starting with fiduciary responsibility to shareholders who have entrusted the management. The Code contains key principles that can contribute to effective corporate governance for the purpose of achieving “growth-oriented governance” beyond “defensive governance” by promoting timely and decisive decision-making based upon transparent and fair decision-making through the fulfillment of a company's accountability in relation to their responsibilities to shareholders and stakeholders.

The Code calls for appropriate corporate governance disciplines to create an environment for promoting healthy entrepreneurship where the management can perform their management skills to the full, which ultimately leads to a company's sustainable growth and increased corporate value over the mid- to long-term. It is not appropriate to view each Principle (General Principle and Principle) as a limit on the management. Rather, each Principle promotes the management's decisive decision-making and business activities with risk-taking.

2. It is hoped that the Code will also have the effect of promoting mid- to long-term investment. Market participants who have the strongest expectations for the improvement of corporate governance are usually shareholders with mid- to long-term holdings, and they usually wait until corporate governance improvements are achieved.

Notwithstanding recent concerns over the growth of investment activities based on short-termism in the market place, such shareholders with mid- to long-term holdings have the potential of becoming important partners for companies. The Code asks companies to examine whether there are issues in their corporate governance in light of the aim and spirit of the Principles of the Code, and take self-motivated actions in response to those issues. Such efforts by a company will make possible further corporate governance improvements, supported by constructive and purposeful dialogue with shareholders (institutional investors) based on the company's explanation of its path for growth over mid- to long-term. In this sense, the Code and "Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors" «Japan's Stewardship Code» are like "the two wheels of a cart," and it is hoped that these will work appropriately and together for achieving effective corporate governance in Japan.

3. The Code is formulated for these purposes, and it is expected that the management of companies will use this Code as supporting material when considering and implementing company initiatives. Proactive initiatives taken by the management toward improving corporate governance to achieve a company's ideal state with sufficient attention to principles of the Code are beneficial to various stakeholders.

"Principles-Based Approach" and "Comply or Explain"

4. The Code does not adopt a rule-based approach, in which the actions to be taken by a company are specified in detail. Rather, it adopts a principles-based approach. Accordingly, companies should judge whether their activities are consistent with the Principles of the Code in light of the aim and spirit of the principles, not against the literal statements and wording of the principles, even where the principles may appear abstract and broad on the surface. Shareholders and other stakeholders are also expected to fully understand the significance of this principles-based approach in their dialogue with companies.
5. The Code adopts a "comply or explain" approach (either comply with a Principle or explain the reasons for not doing so). In other words, the Code is not legally binding and assumes that if a company finds a specific Principle it considers inappropriate to comply with in view of its individual circumstances, the company may choose not to comply with that Principle, provided that the company explains fully the reason why it does not comply. Further, this means that, depending on a company's situation, there are cases where a company should refrain from formalistically complying with a Principle, and instead should proactively choose to "explain." It is desirable that companies choose to comply or explain in light of the aim and spirit of each Principle

and fully recognize the aim of “comply or explain.”

In addition, when companies choose to explain for a Principle they will not comply with, they should carefully tailor their explanation in light of the aim and spirit of a Principle in a manner such that their explanation will be fully understood by shareholders and other stakeholders. Companies should fully recognize that offering a superficial explanation using boiler-plate expressions would be inconsistent with the concept of comply or explain. Accordingly, companies should provide “carefully tailored explanation.”

6. Also, from the perspective of providing sufficient information to shareholders and other stakeholders, instead of simply complying with a Principle, explaining the specific content of measures a company has taken and the reasonable grounds for evaluating why it complies with a Principle through measures is a desirable initiative for promoting constructive dialogue.
7. On the other hand, it is also necessary that shareholders and other stakeholders understand the aim of the comply or explain approach and sufficiently consider the specific circumstances of companies. Particularly, it is not appropriate to mechanically assess that effective corporate governance is not realized based solely on the fact of partial non-compliance with some Principles while superficially interpreting wording and statements of the Principles of this Code. In such a case, shareholders and other stakeholders should constructively assess the company’s carefully tailored explanation.~~decision to explain.~~

Application of this Code

8. Principles in this Code are comprised of General Principles and Principles. Whether a company should comply or how they should comply depends on its industry, size, business characteristics, organizational structure and business environment. Accordingly, companies should purposefully implement each Principle in this Code to achieve effective corporate governance in light of their surrounding situation.
9. All General Principles and some Principles in this Code include “Interpretive Guidance” sections. “Interpretive Guidance” is not subject to comply or explain. However, its role is to support effective implementation of each Principle. It contains measures considered to be best practices and good practices for carrying out Principles, as well as the background and purposes of the Principle. In this context, “Interpretive Guidance” is a part of the Code together with Principles. When implementing each Principle of this Code, Companies are expected to use “Interpretive Guidance” is to be used as a reference when implementing the Code. Each company has discretion in implementing

specific measures, as long as the company acts in accordance with the aim and spirit of each Principle.

10. Some Principles in this Code assume specific organizational structures. With respect to such Principles, companies that adopt other organizational structures are expected to construe and apply such Principles in accordance with their specific organizational structures.

“Streamlining” of the Code to Promote Implementation by Companies in Substance

11. Since the Code took effect in 2015, corporate governance reform in Japan has seen progress to some extent. However, in order to truly achieve sustainable growth and increased corporate value of companies over the mid- to long-term, it is important not to end at formalistic implementation, but to realize corporate governance reform in substance with efforts by both companies and investors. Based on such problem recognition, in the 202X revisions of the Code, the Code was streamlined from the perspective of giving substance to the Code itself while going back to the aim and spirit of the Code, which applies a principles-based approach and comply or explain approach.

Specifically, in order to clarify on which items a company should focus, then existing Supplementary Principles were reclassified by upgrading core parts of corporate governance to Principles, while removing parts that overlapped with other provisions within the Code or other laws and regulations. Since the Code aims to support management in considering and implementing measures to increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term, the Code was revised to emphasize key elements as concisely as possible and to distinguish important items from others.

12. These are the purposes of streamlining the Code. The intent is not to only reduce company implementation costs and disclosure burdens. It is not appropriate to understand that those provisions or statements that have been moved to “Interpretive Guidance” and are outside of the scope of comply or explain or that have been removed from the Code have lost importance after the 202X revisions. Companies are expected to implement each Principle of the Code in substance while fully understanding the aim of streamlining of the Code.

Notes on the 202X Revisions

13. Given that annual securities reports contain useful and reliable information for decision making by investors, the 202X revisions states that the submission of annual

securities reports before general shareholder meetings is a key measure to ensure the appropriate exercise of rights by shareholders at general shareholder meetings as stated in Principle 1.2.

The Interpretative Guidance complements the Principle by stating that it is best to submit annual securities reports at least three weeks before the general shareholders meetings, and companies should consider such measures as moving back the dates of general shareholder meetings. The Financial Services Agency acknowledges the operational burden and difficulty of submission of annual securities reports three weeks or more before the dates of general shareholder meetings given common practices under the existing laws. The Financial Services Agency will coordinate in tandem with the Ministry of Justice to consider the legal framework. This includes the consolidation of annual securities reports and business reports and the unification of audits required under the Companies Act and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act as discussed by the Legislative Council, and the optimization of disclosure items in the annual securities reports.

General Principles

Securing the Rights and Equal Treatment of Shareholders, and Dialogue with Shareholders

1. Companies should take appropriate measures to fully secure shareholder rights and develop an environment in which shareholders can exercise their rights appropriately and effectively.

In addition, companies should secure effective equal treatment of shareholders.

Given their particular sensitivities, adequate consideration should be given to the issues and concerns of minority shareholders and foreign shareholders for the effective exercise of shareholder rights and effective equal treatment of shareholders.

In order to contribute to sustainable growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term, companies should engage in constructive dialogue with shareholders even outside the general shareholder meeting.

Appropriate Cooperation with Stakeholders Other Than Shareholders

2. Companies should fully recognize that their sustainable growth and the creation of mid- to long-term corporate value are brought about as a result of the provision of resources and contributions made by a range of stakeholders, including employees, customers, business partners, creditors and local communities. As such, companies should endeavor to appropriately cooperate with these stakeholders.

The board and the management should exercise their leadership in establishing a corporate culture where the rights and positions of stakeholders are respected and sound business ethics are ensured.

Ensuring Appropriate Information Disclosure and Transparency

3. Companies should appropriately make information disclosure in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, but should also strive to actively provide information beyond that required by law. This includes both financial information, such as financial standing and operating results, and non-financial information,

such as business strategies and business issues, risk and governance.

The board should recognize that disclosed information will serve as the basis for constructive dialogue with shareholders, and therefore ensure that such information, particularly non-financial information, is accurate, clear and useful.

Responsibilities of the Board

4. Given its fiduciary responsibility and accountability to shareholders, in order to promote sustainable corporate growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term and enhance earnings power and capital efficiency, the board should appropriately fulfill its roles and responsibilities, including:
 - (1) Setting the broad direction of corporate strategy;
 - (2) Establishing an environment where appropriate risk-taking by the **senior** management is supported; and
 - (3) Carrying out effective oversight of directors and the management (including *shikkoyaku* and so-called *shikkoyakuin*) from an independent and objective standpoint.

~~Such roles and responsibilities should be equally and appropriately fulfilled regardless of the form of corporate organization i.e., Company with *Kansayaku* Board (where a part of these roles and responsibilities are performed by *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board), Company with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration), or Company with Supervisory Committee.~~

Dialogue with Shareholders

- ~~5. In order to contribute to sustainable growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term, companies should engage in constructive dialogue with shareholders even outside the general shareholder meeting.~~

~~During such dialogue, senior management and directors, including outside directors, should listen to the views of shareholders and pay due attention to their interests and concerns, clearly explain business policies to shareholders in an understandable manner so as to gain their support, and work for developing a balanced understanding of the positions of shareholders and other stakeholders and acting accordingly.~~

Section 1: Securing the Rights and Equal Treatment of Shareholders, and Dialogue with Shareholders

[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Combined and organized section 1 and 5 from the perspectives of (i) organizing section 1 as provisions relevant to shareholders and section 2 as provisions relevant to stakeholders other than shareholders, and (ii) combining and organizing it into the opening chapter in light of the importance of dialogue with shareholders.]

General Principle 1

Companies should take appropriate measures to fully secure shareholder rights and develop an environment in which shareholders can exercise their rights appropriately and effectively.

In addition, companies should secure effective equal treatment of shareholders.

Given their particular sensitivities, adequate consideration should be given to the issues and concerns of minority shareholders and foreign shareholders for the effective exercise of shareholder rights and effective equal treatment of shareholders.

In order to contribute to sustainable growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term, companies should engage in constructive dialogue with shareholders even outside the general shareholder meeting. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The current General Principle 5 (front part).]

Interpretive Guidance Notes

Companies have various stakeholders, including shareholders. Without appropriate cooperation with these stakeholders, it would be difficult for companies to achieve sustainable growth. Suppliers of capital are an important cornerstone, and shareholders are the primary starting point for corporate governance discipline. Companies should secure appropriate cooperation with shareholders and strive toward the achievement of sustainable growth by fully securing shareholder rights and providing for the smooth exercise thereof.

In addition, the Companies Act requires companies to equally treat shareholders based on the class and number of shares they hold. Gaining broad confidence of shareholders that they receive equal treatment will also contribute to strengthening support from the suppliers of capital.

Given the importance of shareholder rights, companies should ensure that the exercise of shareholder rights is not impeded. In particular, adequate consideration should be given to the special rights that are recognized for minority shareholders with respect to companies and their officers, including the right to seek an injunction against illegal activities or the right to file a shareholder lawsuit, since the exercise of these rights tends to be prone to issues and concerns. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the Current Supplementary Principle 1.1.3.] Also given the issues of structural conflicts of interest and information asymmetry among minority shareholders, management and controlling shareholders, companies should ensure appropriate procedures and safeguard the interests of minority shareholders by thoroughly evaluating the necessity and rationale from the perspectives of whether, for example: (i) the objective of adopting and triggering an anti-takeover measure is not associated with entrenchment of the management or the board; (ii) a company's capital policy that results in a change of control or in significant dilution, including share offerings and management buyouts, will not unfairly harm the existing shareholders' interests; and (iii) related party transactions will not harm the interests of the company or the common interests of its shareholders. [Added: Addition from the perspective of minority shareholder protection given deletion of the current Principle 1.5-1.7.] Controlling shareholders should respect the common interests of the company and its shareholders and should not treat minority shareholders unfairly. Companies with a controlling shareholder should develop a governance system to protect the interest of minority shareholders. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The current General Principle 4 Note.]

Also, because capital policy may have a significant effect on shareholder returns, as a significant premise for substantively securing the rights of shareholders, companies should explain their basic strategy with respect to their capital policy. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the Current Supplementary Principle 1.3.]

With the establishment of Japan's Stewardship Code, institutional investors should engage in purposeful dialogue (engagement) based on the in-depth knowledge of investee companies and their business environment. Regularly engaging in dialogue with shareholders to gain their understanding of specific business strategies and business plans and taking appropriate action when there are concerns are extraordinarily useful for companies to strengthen the foundations of management legitimacy and support their efforts to generate sustainable growth. During dialogue with shareholders, management and directors should listen to the views of shareholders and pay due attention to their interests and concerns, clearly explain business policies to shareholders in an understandable manner so as to gain their support, and work for developing a balanced

understanding of the positions of shareholders and other stakeholders and acting accordingly. If the management and directors give due attention to the views of shareholders through dialogue, they can absorb views and analyses of business management from the perspective of capital providers. Dialogue with shareholders should also inspire healthy entrepreneurship in the management and directors and thereby contribute to sustainable corporate growth. **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue, moved to Interpretive Guidance: Combined the current General Principle 5 (the latter part) and Notes of General Principle 5.]**

Principle 1.1 Constructive Dialogue with Shareholders

- (1) Companies should, positively and to the extent reasonable, respond to the requests from shareholders to engage in dialogue so as to support sustainable growth and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term. The board should establish, approve and disclose policies concerning the measures and organizational structures aimed at promoting constructive dialogue with shareholders. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Combined the current Principle 5.1.]
- (2) Taking the requests and interests of shareholders into consideration, to the extent reasonable, the management, directors, including outside directors¹, and *kansayaku*, should basically engage in dialogue with shareholders. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue, upgraded to Principle: Combined and moved from the current Supplementary Principle 5.1.1.]
- (3) Based on the content of dialogue with shareholders, companies should take appropriate measures such as internally sharing information and conducting reviews as necessary. [Added]

Interpretive Guidance

Policies for promoting constructive dialogue with shareholders should at minimum include (i) appointing a member of the management or a director who is responsible for overseeing and ensuring that constructive dialogue takes place, including the matters stated in items (ii) to (v) below, (ii) measures to ensure positive cooperation between internal departments such as investor relations, corporate planning, general affairs, human resources, corporate finance, accounting and legal affairs with the aim of supporting dialogue, (iii) measures to promote opportunities for dialogue aside from individual meetings (e.g., general investor meetings and other IR activities), (iv) measures to appropriately and effectively relay shareholder views and concerns learned through dialogue to the management and the board, and (v) measures to control insider information and material information to which the fair disclosure rule applies when engaging in dialogue. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue /moved to Interpretive Guidance: Combined and moved from the current

¹ Outside director: A director who satisfies certain requirements such as not holding specific positions, including the position of executive director, in the company or its subsidiaries (Article 2, Paragraph 15 of the Companies Act). Furthermore, matters such as not holding a specific position in the parent company or other subsidiaries and not having specific kinship ties with controlling shareholders is also required for outside directors under the Companies Act.

Supplementary Principle 5.1.2.]

Companies should recognize that there are situations where outside directors should engage in dialogue depending on the main topics of dialogue and should select appropriate persons for each dialogue from the perspective of holding constructive dialogue with shareholders, taking into consideration the requests from shareholders and the main topic of the dialogue. **[Added: Statement regarding a director, including outside director, handling dialogue with shareholders.]**

Principle 1.1 Securing the Rights of Shareholders

~~Companies should take appropriate measures to fully secure shareholder rights, including voting rights at the general shareholder meeting.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with General Principle 1.]**

Supplementary Principles

~~1.1.1—When the board recognizes that a considerable number of votes have been cast against a proposal by the company and the proposal was approved, it should analyze the reasons behind opposing votes and why many shareholders opposed, and should consider the need for shareholder dialogue and other measures.~~ **[Upgraded to newly added Principle 1.3: Remains important as a provision relevant to shareholders' direct exercise of rights.]**

~~1.1.2—When proposing to shareholders that certain powers of the general shareholder meeting be delegated to the board, companies should consider whether the board is adequately constituted to fulfill its corporate governance roles and responsibilities. If a company determines that the board is indeed adequately constituted, then it should recognize that such delegation may be desirable from the perspectives of agile decision-making and expertise in business judgment.~~ **[Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]**

~~1.1.3—Given the importance of shareholder rights, companies should ensure that the exercise of shareholder rights is not impeded. In particular, adequate consideration should be given to the special rights that are recognized for minority shareholders with respect to companies and their officers, including the right to seek an injunction against illegal activities or the right to file a~~

~~shareholder lawsuit, since the exercise of these rights tend to be prone to issues and concerns.~~ [Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 1: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 1 to promote implementation in substance, as it concerns protection of minority shareholders to secure the rights and equal treatment of shareholders (General Principle 1).]

Principle 1.2 Exercise of Shareholder Rights at General Shareholder Meetings

Companies should, ~~recognize considering~~ that general shareholder meetings are an opportunity for constructive dialogue with shareholders, ~~and should therefore~~ take appropriate measures from the shareholders' perspective to ensure the exercise of shareholder rights at such meetings, ~~for example, providing accurate information to shareholders as necessary in order to facilitate appropriate decision-making at general shareholder meetings such as by submitting the aAnnual sSecurities rReports before the general shareholder meetings~~ [Added and upgraded to Principle 1.2.1: Upgraded to Principle and added statement regarding disclosure of annual securities report before Annual General Meeting.], ~~appropriately setting the dates related to general shareholder meetings including dates of meetings and record dates for exercising voting rights~~ [Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 1.2.3.], ~~and for companies listed on the Prime Market, making the Electronic Voting Platform available, at least to institutional investors.~~ [Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 1.2.4 (the latter part).]

Interpretive Guidance

~~General shareholder meetings provide one of the few opportunities for shareholders to directly express their opinions to companies through the exercise of their voting rights and opportunities for constructive dialogue with shareholders. Companies should take appropriate measures from the perspectives of shareholders to enable shareholders to facilitate appropriate decision-making at general shareholder meetings.~~ [Clarification of the aim of the Principle]

For Example:

- (i) ~~In particular, although the number of companies that submit Annual Securities Reports before the general shareholder meetings is increasing, sSince aAnnual sSecurities rReports contain useful and reliable information for decision-making by~~

investors, including information related to governance such as remuneration of directors and cross-shareholdings, it is best to submit aAnnual sSecurities rReports at least three weeks before the general shareholder meetings. €To do so, companies should consider such measures as moving back the dates of general shareholder meetings and the record dates for exercising voting rights from the customary time under the current practice and take further measures to ensure appropriate exercise of rights by shareholders. **[Added: Explanation related to submission of annual securities reports before Annual General meeting in Principle 1.2.]**

(ii) And eCompanies should disclose information included in the convening notice through electronic means such as through TDnet² or on the company's website during the period between the board approval of convening the general shareholder meeting and sending the convening notice to give shareholders sufficient time to consider the agenda. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the Current Supplementary Principle 1.2.2.]**

(iii) In addition to the above, Bbearing in mind the number of institutional and foreign shareholders, companies should take steps for the creation of an infrastructure allowing electronic voting, including the use of the Electronic Voting Platform, and the provision of English translations of the convening notices of general shareholder meetings. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the Current Supplementary Principle 1.2.4 (the former part).]**

(iv) In order to prepare for cases where institutional investors who hold shares in street name express an interest in advance of the general shareholder meeting in attending the general shareholder meeting or exercising voting rights, companies should work with athe trust bank (*shintaku ginko*) and/or custodial institutions to consider such possibility. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the Current Supplementary Principle 1.2.5.]**

Supplementary Principles

1.2.1 Companies should provide accurate information to shareholders as necessary in

² TDnet: The Tokyo Stock Exchange operates a real-time internet service (Timely Disclosure network) which distributes the information provided by listed companies on a timely basis in accordance with its listing rules.

~~order to facilitate appropriate decision-making at general shareholder meetings.~~

[Added and upgraded to Principle 1.2: Upgraded to Principle and added statement regarding disclosure of annual securities report before Annual General Meeting.]

~~1.2.2 While ensuring the accuracy of content, companies should strive to send convening notices for general shareholder meetings early enough to give shareholders sufficient time to consider the agenda. During the period between the board approval of convening the general shareholder meeting and sending the convening notice, information included in the convening notice should be disclosed by electronic means such as through TDnet³ or on the company's website.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 1.2: Although the scope of provision of information by electronic means at least 3 weeks before the Annual General Meetings overlaps with the Companies Act, appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 1.2 to promote implementation in substance, as early disclosure remains important for the exercise of rights at general shareholder meetings.]**

~~1.2.3 The determination of the date of the general shareholder meeting and any associated dates should be made in consideration of facilitating sufficient constructive dialogue with shareholders and ensuring the accuracy of information necessary for such dialogue.~~ **[Added and upgraded to Principle 1.2: Important in terms of shareholders' exercise of rights.]**

~~1.2.4 Bearing in mind the number of institutional and foreign shareholders, companies should take steps for the creation of an infrastructure allowing electronic voting, including the use of the Electronic Voting Platform, and the provision of English translations of the convening notices of general shareholder meeting.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 1.2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 1.2 to promote implementation in substance, as it includes examples of ensuring the exercise of shareholder rights at general shareholder meetings (Principle 1.2).]**

~~In particular, companies listed on the Prime Market should make the Electronic Voting Platform available, at least to institutional investors.~~ **[Upgraded to**

Principle 1.2: Important in terms of shareholders' exercise of rights.]

~~1.2.5 In order to prepare for cases where institutional investors who hold shares in street name express an interest in advance of the general shareholder meeting in attending the general shareholder meeting or exercising voting rights, companies should work with the trust bank (*shintaku ginko*) and/or custodial institutions to consider such possibility.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 1.2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 1.2 to promote implementation in substance, as it is important in terms of the exercise of shareholder rights at general shareholder meetings by beneficial shareholders (Principle 1.2).]**

Principle 1.3 Company Proposals that are Opposed to by a Considerable Number of Shareholders at General Shareholder Meetings

When the board recognizes that a considerable number of votes have been cast against a proposal by the company and the proposal was approved, it should analyze the reasons behind opposing votes and why many shareholders opposed **[Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 1.1.1.]**, and take actions appropriately in order to contribute to ensuring the shareholder rights.

Interpretive Guidance

For example, the board could explain to shareholders the results of an analysis on the reasons behind opposing votes and why many shareholders opposed, as well as the status of the company's response measures based on the analysis. **[Added: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to newly added Principle 1.3 to promote implementation in substance, by providing examples of responses that are required regarding the company proposals that were opposed to by a considerable number of shareholders at general shareholder meetings to foster principle-based approach.]**

Principle 1.3 Basic Strategy for Capital Policy

~~Because capital policy may have a significant effect on shareholder returns, companies should explain their basic strategy with respect to their capital policy.~~ **[Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 1:]**

Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 1 to promote implementation in substance, as it concerns protection of minority shareholders to secure the rights and equal treatment of shareholders (General Principle 1).]

Principle 1.4 Cross-Shareholdings

When companies hold shares of other listed companies as cross-shareholdings⁴, they should disclose their policy with respect to doing so, including their policies regarding the reduction of cross-shareholdings. In addition, the board should annually assess whether or not to hold each individual cross-shareholding, specifically examining whether the purpose is appropriate and whether the benefits and risks from each holding cover the company's cost of capital. The results of this assessment should be disclosed.

Companies should establish and disclose specific standards with respect to the voting rights as to their cross-shareholdings, and vote in accordance with the standards.

When cross-shareholders (i.e., shareholders who hold a company's shares for the purpose of cross-shareholding) indicate their intention to sell their shares, companies should not hinder the sale of the cross-held shares by, for instance, implying a possible reduction of business transactions. **[Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 1.4.1.]**

Companies should not engage in transactions with cross-shareholders which may harm the interests of the companies or the common interests of their shareholders by, for instance, continuing the transactions without carefully examining the underlying economic rationale. **[Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 1.4.2.]**

Supplementary Principles

~~1.4.1 — When cross-shareholders (i.e., shareholders who hold a company's shares for the purpose of cross-shareholding) indicate their intention to sell their shares, companies should not hinder the sale of the cross-held shares by, for instance,~~

⁴ Cross-shareholding: There are cases where listed companies hold the shares of other listed companies for reasons other than pure investment purposes, for example, to strengthen business relationships. Cross-shareholdings here include not only mutual shareholdings but also unilateral ones.

~~implying a possible reduction of business transactions.~~ [Upgraded to Principle 1.4: Remains important as a provision relevant to cross-shareholding (Principle 1.4)]

~~1.4.2— Companies should not engage in transactions with cross-shareholders which may harm the interests of the companies or the common interests of their shareholders by, for instance, continuing the transactions without carefully examining the underlying economic rationale.~~ [Upgraded to Principle 1.4: Remains important as a provision relevant to cross-shareholding (Principle 1.4)]

Principle 1.5 Anti-Takeover Measures

~~Anti takeover measures must not have any objective associated with entrenchment of the management or the board. With respect to the adoption or implementation of anti-takeover measures, the board and *kansayaku*⁵ should carefully examine their necessity and rationale in light of their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, ensure appropriate procedures, and provide sufficient explanation to shareholders.~~ [Removed: Overlaps with other laws and regulations, as Timely Disclosure is required upon adoption of a poison pill under the Securities Listing Regulations, excluding any poison pill adopted in clear day that does not have material impact on investment decisions of investors.]

Supplementary Principle

~~1.5.1— In case of a tender offer, companies should clearly explain the position of the board, including any counteroffers, and should not take measures that would frustrate shareholder rights to sell their shares in response to the tender offer.~~ [Removed: Overlaps with other laws and regulations, as the target company is obligated to submit a Position Statement Report under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act and Timely Disclosure is required under the Securities Listing Regulations.]

Principle 1.6 Capital Policy that May Harm Shareholder Interests

⁵~~*Kansayaku*~~: See [Notes](#) to the General Principle 4.

~~With respect to a company's capital policy that results in the change of control or in significant dilution, including share offerings and management buyouts, the board and *kansayaku* should, in order not to unfairly harm the existing shareholders' interests, carefully examine the necessity and rationale from the perspective of their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, should ensure appropriate procedures, and provide sufficient explanation to shareholders.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with other laws and regulations, as Timely Disclosure is required under the Securities Listing Regulations.]**

Principle 1.7 Related Party Transactions

~~When a company engages in transactions with its directors or major shareholders (i.e., related party transactions), in order to ensure that such transactions do not harm the interests of the company or the common interests of its shareholders and prevent any concerns with respect to such harm, the board should establish appropriate procedures beforehand in proportion to the importance and characteristics of the transaction. In addition to their use by the board in approving and monitoring such transactions, these procedures should be disclosed.~~ **[Removed, combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Some overlap with Principle 4.3 regarding related parties. The part “establish appropriate procedures beforehand in proportion to the importance and characteristics of the transaction” is combined and organized into Principle 4.3 as this part does not overlap with other laws and regulations and the Code.]**

Section 2: Appropriate Cooperation with Stakeholders Other Than Shareholders

General Principle 2

Companies should fully recognize that their sustainable growth and the creation of mid- to long-term corporate value are brought about as a result of the provision of resources and contributions made by a range of stakeholders, including employees, customers, business partners, creditors and local communities. As such, companies should endeavor to appropriately cooperate with these stakeholders.

The board and the management should exercise their leadership in establishing a corporate culture where the rights and positions of stakeholders are respected and sound business ethics are ensured.

Interpretive Guidance Notes

Companies have a variety of important stakeholders besides shareholders. These stakeholders include internal parties such as employees and external parties such as customers, business partners and creditors. In addition, local communities form the foundation for the on-going business activities of companies. Companies should fully recognize that ~~appropriate cooperation with these stakeholders is indispensable in achieving~~ sustainable growth and increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term can be achieved through appropriate cooperation with these stakeholders including through investment in human capital, appropriate distribution and fair and reasonable transaction with suppliers (including a fair price-passthrough within a supply chain).

[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

~~Moreover, given that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted at the United Nations Summit and the number of organizations supporting the recommendation of the FSB's Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) has increased, there is a growing awareness that sustainability (mid-to long-term sustainability including ESG factors) is an important management issue from the perspective of increasing mid-to long-term corporate value. In light of this, it is important for Japanese companies to further promote positive and proactive responses to sustainability issues.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue, updated reflecting recent developments: Provisions related to sustainability (current Principles 2.3, 2.3.1, 4.2.2**

front part) are combined and organized under the new Principle 4.5 and its interpretative guidance. This statement is moved to interpretative guidance of the new Principle 4.5.]

The appropriate actions of companies based on the recognition of their stakeholder responsibilities will benefit the entire economy and society, which will in turn contribute to producing further benefits to companies, thereby creating a virtuous cycle. Furthermore, investments that contribute to local communities resulting in increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term are important in the context of revitalizing the foundation of company sustainability and activities. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Based on such awareness, companies should draft and implement a code of conduct for employees in order to express their values with respect to appropriate cooperation with and serving the interests of stakeholders and carrying out sound and ethical business activities. The board should be responsible for drafting and revising the code of conduct, and should ensure its compliance broadly across the organization, including the front line of domestic and global operations. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Principle 2.2.]

Principle 2.1 Business Principles as the Foundation of Corporate Value Creation Over the Mid- to Long-Term

Guided by their position concerning social responsibility, companies should undertake their businesses in order to create value for all stakeholders while increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term. To this end, companies should draft and maintain business principles that will become the basis for such activities.

Principle 2.2 Code of Conduct

~~Companies should draft and implement a code of conduct for employees in order to express their values with respect to appropriate cooperation with and serving the interests of stakeholders and carrying out sound and ethical business activities. The board should be responsible for drafting and revising the code of conduct, and should ensure its compliance broadly across the organization, including the front line of domestic and global operations.~~ **[Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 2 (together with Supplementary Principle 2.2.1) to promote implementation in substance, as it includes specific measures for fostering corporate culture by the board and management (General Principle 2).]**

Supplementary Principle

~~2.2.1 — The board should review regularly (or where appropriate) whether or not the code of conduct is being widely implemented. The review should focus on the substantive assessment of whether the company's corporate culture truly embraces the intent and spirit of the code of conduct, and not solely on the form of implementation and compliance.~~ **[Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 2 (together with Principle 2.2 and simplified) to promote implementation in substance, as it includes specific measures for fostering corporate culture by the board of directors and management (General Principle 2).]**

~~Principle 2.3 Sustainability Issues, Including Social and Environmental Matters~~

~~Companies should take appropriate measures to address sustainability issues, including social and environmental matters.~~ [Combined provisions covering the same issue and organized: Together with the current Supplementary Principle 2.3.1, provisions related to sustainability (current 2.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.3 (front part) and 4.2.2 (front part)) are combined, organized and moved to newly added Principle 4.5 and its Interpretive Guidance, as the necessity of keeping this abstract Principle independently in this Section 2 is low and the current 2.3.1, which includes specific measures of this particular Principle, is more relevant to Responsibilities of the Board (Section 4).]

Supplementary Principle

~~2.3.1 The board should recognize that dealing with sustainability issues, such as taking care of climate change and other global environmental issues, respect of human rights, fair and appropriate treatment of the workforce including caring for their health and working environment, fair and reasonable transactions with suppliers, and crisis management for natural disasters, are important management issues that can lead to earning opportunities as well as risk mitigation, and should further consider addressing these matters positively and proactively in terms of increasing corporate value over the mid-to-long term.~~ [Combined provisions covering the same issue and organized, and moved to Interpretive Guidance of newly added Principle 4.5: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 2.3 to promote implementation in substance, as this provision specifies measures for sustainability related issues (the current Principle 2.3). Also, this Supplementary Principle 2.3.1, the current Principle 2.3 and other sustainability related provisions (current 2.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.3 (front part), and 4.2.2 (front part)) should be combined and organized under the newly added Principle 4.5 and its Interpretive Guidance as these concern Responsibilities of the Board (Section 4).]

Principle 2.24 Ensuring Diversity, Including Active Participation of Women

~~Companies should recognize that the existence of diverse perspectives and values reflecting a variety of experiences, skills and characteristics is a strength that supports their sustainable growth.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary

guidance to Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision prescribes the reasons and perspectives of ensuring diversity within companies.]~~As such, companies should promote diversity of personnel, including the active participation of women.~~

Companies should determine and disclose the status of their policies and voluntary and measurable goals for ensuring diversity, including the promotion of women, global talent and lateral employees to senior positions in the company from perspectives including gender, international experience, career experience (including lateral employees), age, and cultural background. **[Upgraded to Principle, partially adjusted: Current Supplementary Principle 2.4.1 (the front part).]**

Companies should disclose its policies for human resource development and internal environment development to ensure diversity, as well as the status of their implementation. **[Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 2.4.1 (the latter part).]**

Interpretive Guidance

The existence of diverse perspectives and values reflecting a variety of experiences, skills and characteristics is a source of innovation and new value creation and can be a strength that supports companies' transformation and sustainable growth. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance and partially revised: The current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised).]** In light of the importance of human resource strategies to achieve sustainable growth, companies should determine their policies and voluntary and measurable goals for ensuring diversity suitable for its situation from perspectives including, but not limited to, gender, international experience, career experience (including lateral employees), age, nationality, and cultural background. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance and partially revised: The current Supplementary Principle 2.4.1.]**

Supplementary Principle

2.4.1 — ~~Companies should present their policies and voluntary and measurable goals for ensuring diversity in the promotion to core human resources, such as the promotion of women, foreign nationals and midcareer hires to middle managerial positions, as well as disclosing their status.~~ **[Upgraded to the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised) and moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised): (i) Remains**

important as a provision prescribing the background and measurable objective of ensuring diversity and emphasizing disclosure of policy and status of implementation, (ii) appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance describing “gender, international experience, career experience, age and cultural background” as examples of diversity (the current Principle 2-4 (Principle 2.2 as revised)) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision introduces examples of diversity (the current Principle 2-4 (Principle 2.2 as revised)).]

~~In addition, in light of the importance of human resource strategies for increasing corporate value over the mid-to-long term,~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this statement describes the reasons and perspectives of the below statement which is upgraded to the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised)]~~companies should present its policies for human resource development and internal environment development to ensure diversity, as well as the status of their implementation.~~ [Upgraded to the current Principle 2.4 (Principle 2.2 as revised): Remains important from the perspective of ensuring diversity.]

Principle 2.3 WhistleblowingPrinciple 2.5 Whistleblowing

~~Companies should establish an appropriate framework for whistleblowing such that employees can report illegal or inappropriate behavior, disclosures, or any other serious concerns without fear of suffering from disadvantageous treatment.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 2.5 (Principle 4.3 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this statement contains the perspectives and examples of “establishing appropriate framework” and “monitoring enforcement” (the current Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised)).] ~~Also, the framework should allow for an objective assessment and appropriate response to the reported issues, and the board should be responsible for both establishing this framework, and ensuring and monitoring its enforcement.~~Companies should establish an appropriate framework for whistleblowing, and the board should monitor its enforcement.

Interpretive Guidance

Companies should establish an appropriate framework for whistleblowing such that employees can report illegal or inappropriate behavior, disclosures, or any other serious concerns without fear of suffering from disadvantageous treatment. Also, the framework should allow for an objective assessment and appropriate response to the reported issues.

[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: the current Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised)] As a part of establishing a framework for whistleblowing, companies should establish a point of contact that is independent of the management and rules to secure the confidentiality of the information provider and prohibit any disadvantageous treatment.**[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: the current Principle 2.5.1.]**

Supplementary Principle

~~2.5.1—As a part of establishing a framework for whistleblowing, companies should establish a point of contact that is independent of the management (for example, a panel consisting of outside directors⁶ and outside *kansayaku*⁷). In addition, rules should be established to secure the confidentiality of the information provider and prohibit any disadvantageous treatment. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this statement contains the perspectives and examples of “establishing appropriate framework” and “monitoring enforcement” (the current Principle 2.5 (Principle 2.3 as revised)).]**~~

⁶Outside director: A director who satisfies certain requirements such as not holding specific positions, including the position of executive director, in the company or its subsidiaries (Article 2, Paragraph 15 of the Companies Act). Furthermore, matters such as not holding a specific position in the parent company or other subsidiaries and not having specific kinship ties with controlling shareholders is also required for outside directors under the Companies Act.

⁷Outside *kansayaku*: A *kansayaku* who satisfies certain requirements such as not holding specific positions, including the position of director, in the company or its subsidiaries (Article 2, Paragraph 16 of the Companies Act). Furthermore, matters such as not holding a specific position in the parent company or other subsidiaries and not having specific kinship ties with controlling shareholders is also required for outside *kansayaku* under the Companies Act.

Principle 2.436 Roles of Corporate Pension Funds as Asset Owners

Because the management of corporate pension funds impacts stable asset formation for employees and companies' own financial standing, companies should take and disclose measures to improve human resources and operational practices, such as the recruitment or assignment of qualified persons, in order to increase the investment management expertise of corporate pension funds (including stewardship activities such as monitoring the asset managers of corporate pension funds), thus making sure that corporate pension funds perform their roles as asset owners. Companies should ensure that conflicts of interest which could arise between pension fund beneficiaries and companies are appropriately managed.

Section 3: Ensuring Appropriate Information Disclosure and Transparency

General Principle 3

Companies should appropriately make information disclosure in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations, but should also strive to actively provide information beyond that required by law. This includes both financial information, such as financial standing and operating results, and non-financial information, such as business strategies and business issues, risk and governance.

The board should recognize that disclosed information will serve as the basis for constructive dialogue with shareholders, and therefore ensure that such information, particularly non-financial information, is accurate, clear and useful.

Interpretive Guidance Notes

Companies are legally required to disclose a wide range of information. The timely and appropriate disclosure of information in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations is essential for investor protection and securing market confidence. The board, *kansayaku*, the *kansayaku* board⁸ and external auditors all bear an important responsibility in this regard, starting with the establishment of an appropriate internal control system as to financial information.

In order to enhance transparency and fairness in decision-making and to ensure effective corporate governance, Ccompanies should actively strive to provide information including, but not limited to, other than what is required by laws and regulations and each Principle of the Code. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Principle 3.1.]**

It has been noted that while the quantitative part of financial statements of Japanese companies conform to a standard format and therefore excel with respect to comparability, non-financial information, such as financial standing, business strategies, risks and **ESG** (environmental, social and governance) matters, is often boiler-plate and lacking in detail, therefore less valuable. The board should actively commit to ensure that disclosed information, including non-financial information, is as valuable and useful as possible.

⁸~~Kansayaku board:~~ See Notes to the General Principle 4.

Irrespective of whether the disclosed information is required by law, the appropriate provision of information is an effective means to develop a shared awareness and understanding with shareholders and other stakeholders, in particular given that **as outsiders** they suffer from information asymmetry. Appropriate information disclosure will also contribute to constructive dialogue based on Japan's Stewardship Code.

Principle 3.1 Full Disclosure

In addition to making information disclosure in compliance with relevant laws and regulations, companies should disclose and proactively provide the information listed below ~~(along with the disclosures specified by the principles of the Code) in order to enhance transparency and fairness in decision-making and ensure effective corporate governance:~~ **[Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 3: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 3 to promote implementation in substance, as this provision includes perspectives of appropriate, useful and accurate information disclosure (General Principle 3).]**

- ~~(1i)~~ Company objectives (e.g., business principles), business strategies and business plans;
- ~~(2ii)~~ Basic views and guidelines on corporate governance based on each of the Principles of the Code;
- ~~(3iii)~~ Board policies and procedures in determining the remuneration of the ~~senior~~ management and directors;
- ~~(4iv)~~ Board policies and procedures in the appointment/dismissal of the ~~senior~~ management and the nomination of directors and *kansayaku* candidates; and
- ~~(5v)~~ Explanations with respect to the individual appointments/dismissals and nominations based on ~~(4iv)~~.

Supplementary Principles

~~3.1.1—These disclosures, including disclosures in compliance with relevant laws and regulations, should add value for investors, and the board should ensure that information is not boiler plate or lacking in detail.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with General Principle 3 and its Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised).]**

~~3.1.2—Bearing in mind the number of foreign shareholders, companies should, to the extent reasonable, take steps for providing English language disclosures.~~ **[Upgraded to newly added Principle 3.2: Remains important as a statement relevant to English disclosure.]**

~~In particular, companies listed on the Prime Market should disclose and provide necessary information in their disclosure documents in English.~~ **[Removed:**

Overlaps with other laws and regulations, as financial information and timely disclosure are required to be disclosed in English for companies listed in the Prime market under the Securities Listing Regulations.]

~~3.1.3— Companies should appropriately disclose their initiatives on sustainability when disclosing their management strategies.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Provisions related to sustainability (current 2.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.3 (front part) and 4.2.2 (front part)) are combined and organized under the new Principle 4.5 and its Interpretive Guidance (please see comments for the current Principle 2.3, Supplementary Principle 2.3.1).]** ~~They should also provide information on investments in human capital and intellectual properties in an understandable and specific manner, while being conscious of the consistency with their own management strategies and issues.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Concerning allocation of business resources, current Principles 3.1.3 (front part), 4.2.2 (latter part), 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized under Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance.]**

~~In particular, companies listed on the Prime Market should collect and analyze the necessary data on the impact of climate change related risks and earning opportunities on their business activities and profits, and enhance the quality and quantity of disclosure based on the TCFD recommendations, which are an internationally well established disclosure framework, or an equivalent framework.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with disclosure items of annual securities report.]**

Principle 3.2 English Language Disclosure

~~Bearing in mind the number of foreign shareholders, companies should, to the extent reasonable, take steps for providing English language disclosures.~~ **[Upgraded to Principle: Current Supplementary Principle 3.1.2.]**

Principle 3.32 External Auditors

External auditors and companies should recognize the responsibility that external

auditors owe toward shareholders and investors, and take appropriate steps to secure the proper execution of audits.

Interpretive Guidance

The *kansayaku* board should, at minimum, ensure (i) establishing standards for the appropriate selection of external auditor candidates and proper evaluation of external auditors, and (ii) verifying whether external auditors possess necessary independence and expertise to fulfill their responsibilities. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Supplementary Principle 3.2.1.] The board and the *kansayaku* board should, at minimum, (iii) give adequate time to ensure high quality audits, (iv) ensure that external auditors have access, such as via interviews, to the management including the CEO and the CFO, (v) ensure adequate coordination between external auditors and each of the *kansayaku* (including attendance at the *kansayaku* board meetings), the internal audit department and outside directors, and (vi) ensure that the company is constituted in the way that it can adequately respond to any misconduct, inadequacies or concerns identified by the external auditors. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Supplementary Principle 3.2.2.]

~~Supplementary Principles~~

~~3.2.1—The *kansayaku* board should, at minimum, ensure the following:~~

- ~~i) Establish standards for the appropriate selection of external auditor candidates and proper evaluation of external auditors; and~~
- ~~ii) Verify whether external auditors possess necessary independence and expertise to fulfill their responsibilities. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.3 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.2 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision includes specific examples for “appropriate steps to secure the proper execution of audits” (Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.3 as revised)).]~~

~~3.2.2—The board and the *kansayaku* board should, at minimum, ensure the following:~~

- ~~i) Give adequate time to ensure high quality audits;~~
- ~~ii) Ensure that external auditors have access, such as via interviews, to the~~

senior management including the CEO and the CFO;

- iii) ~~Ensure adequate coordination between external auditors and each of the *kansayaku* (including attendance at the *kansayaku* board meetings), the internal audit department and outside directors; and~~
- iv) ~~Ensure that the company is constituted in the way that it can adequately respond to any misconduct, inadequacies or concerns identified by the external auditors.~~

[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.3 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.2 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision includes specific examples for “appropriate steps to secure the proper execution of audits” (Principle 3.2 (Principle 3.2 as revised)).]

Section 4: Responsibilities of the Board

General Principle 4

Given its fiduciary responsibility and accountability to shareholders, in order to promote sustainable corporate growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term and enhance earnings power and capital efficiency, the board should appropriately fulfill its roles and responsibilities, including:

- (1) Setting the broad direction of corporate strategy;
- (2) Establishing an environment where appropriate risk-taking by the ~~senior~~ management is supported; and
- (3) Carrying out effective oversight of directors and the management (including *shikkoyaku*⁹ and so-called *shikkoyakuin*¹⁰) from an independent and objective standpoint.

~~Such roles and responsibilities should be equally and appropriately fulfilled regardless of the form of corporate organization — i.e., Company with *Kansayaku* Board (where a part of these roles and responsibilities are performed by *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board), Company with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration) or Company with Supervisory Committee. [Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]~~

Interpretive Guidance Notes

With due attention to their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders and the fact that they are elected by shareholders, the directors and *kansayaku* should secure appropriate cooperation with stakeholders other than shareholders and act in the interest of the company and the common interests of its shareholders. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance, partially revised: The current Principle 4.5.]

⁹ *Shikkoyaku*: According to the Companies Act, Companies with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration) must appoint one or more *shikkoyaku* from directors or non-directors by a resolution of the board and delegate business administration to *shikkoyaku*. Also, authority to make certain kinds of business decisions may be delegated to *shikkoyaku*.

¹⁰ *Shikkoyakuin*: There are cases where a Company with *Kansayaku* Board or a Company with Supervisory Committee creates positions with the title of “*shikkoyakuin*” for persons who are delegated by the board a certain range of discretion regarding business administration. Unlike *shikkoyaku* in Companies with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration), *shikkoyakuin* is not a statutory position.

The ideal state of the board changes depending on its path for growth and the situations surrounding the company, and the ideal division of responsibilities between the board and management varies depending on the situations at each company. The board should persistently consider the ideal state of the board based on such perspectives. [Added]

Companies may choose one of three main forms of organizational structure under the Companies Act: Company with *Kansayaku* Board, Company with Three Committees (Nomination, Audit and Remuneration), or Company with Supervisory Committee. ~~A Company with *Kansayaku* Board is a system unique to Japan in which certain governance functions are assumed by the board, *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board. Under this system, *kansayaku* audit the performance of duties by directors and the management and have investigation power by law. Also, to secure both independence and high-level information gathering power, not less than half of *kansayaku*, as appointed at the general shareholder meeting, must be outside *kansayaku*, and at least one full-time *kansayaku* must also be appointed. The latter two forms of organizational structure are similar to companies in other countries where committees are established under the board and assigned certain responsibilities with the aim of strengthening monitoring functions.~~ **[Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]** Irrespective of which form of organizational structure is adopted, what is important is that the various institutions within the company effectively and fully execute their responsibilities through creativity and ingenuity.

~~One of the major objectives of establishing the Code is to promote transparent, fair, timely and decisive decision-making by Japanese companies.~~ **[Removed: Duplication with (substantially stated in) the latter part of this provision.]** The possibility cannot be ruled out that, due to changes in the external environment or other factors, a decision made by a company ultimately results in losses for the company. In such a circumstance, the reasonableness of the decision-making process at the time of the decision is generally considered an important factor in determining whether or not the management and directors should owe personal liability for damages. The Code includes principles and practices that are expected to contribute to such a reasonable decision-making process, and it is expected that these promote transparency, fairness, timeliness and decisiveness as well.

~~Controlling shareholders should respect the common interests of the company and its shareholders and should not treat minority shareholders unfairly, and accordingly, companies with a controlling shareholder are required to develop a governance system to protect the interest of minority shareholders.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions]**

covering the same issue: Combined and organized statements regarding minority shareholder protection under the Interpretive Guidance of General Principle 1.]

Principle 4.1 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board I(+): Setting Strategic Directions for Companies' Business Strategies

The board should view the establishment of corporate goals (e.g., business principles) and the setting of strategic direction such as creating a path for growth toward corporate goals as one major aspect of its roles and responsibilities. It should engage in constructive discussion with respect to specific business strategies and business plans, ~~and ensure that major operational decisions are based on the company's strategic direction.~~ **[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]**

When establishing and disclosing business strategies and business plans, with the aim of achieving growth, the board should articulate their earnings plans and capital policies taking into account the cost of capital, present targets for profitability and capital efficiency, and explain specific measures that will be taken in order to achieve growth related to allocation of business resources such as growth investment (including capital expenditure, R&D, human capital, and intangible assets, including intellectual properties) and review of their business portfolio. **[Added, combined and organized provisions covering the same issue : Regarding allocation of business resources, current Principles 4.2.2, 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized in Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance.]**

Interpretive Guidance

Companies should set a path for growth toward corporate goals (e.g., business principles), taking into account their strengths including competitive advantages and various stakeholders, and operate business activities in accordance with this path. The board has roles and responsibilities in constructing and presenting the path for growth. **[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]**

Based on the path for growth, the board should establish and disclose business strategies and business plans while accurately identifying the company's cost of capital. Also, in order to achieve these presented earnings plans, capital policies and targets for profitability and capital efficiency, companies should appropriately allocate capital and other business resources such as by carrying out growth investments and business portfolio reviews. **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue, partially adjusted: the current Principle 5.2]**

The board should, from the perspective of increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term, provide explanations that are clear and logical to shareholders regarding specific measures that will be taken in order to achieve their business strategies, business plans and capital policy, taking into account its profitability, capital efficiency, the cost of capital, growth potential, growth stage of a company and opportunity cost (loss of profit from taking one option over another). When considering investments, the board should sufficiently recognize that there are various investment opportunities; for example, (i) from ~~such~~the perspectives of growth strategies such as investing internally (investing in ~~existing~~ assets such as capital expenditure, R&D, human capital and intangible assets, including intellectual properties) or investing externally (investing in M&As, business alliances, and start-ups), (ii) from ~~such~~the perspectives of the time horizon such as short or mid- to long-term, (iii) from ~~such~~the perspectives of geographical classification such as domestic investments (investing in regions such as human capital and establishing regional headquarters) or overseas investments. Investing in intangible assets, including intellectual properties, should be addressed strategically in terms of their creation, acquisition, strengthening, protection, and monetization, in recognition of their role as a source of competitiveness and corporate value. [Added, combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: In addition to what the current Principle 5.2 states, added various approaches of investments.]

In formulating and announcing business strategies, companies should clearly present the basic policy regarding the business portfolio decided by the board and the status of the review of such portfolio. ~~Also, companies should clearly and specifically disclose information with respect to investments in human capital and intellectual properties while keeping in mind consistency with their business strategies and plans.~~ [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The current Supplementary Principle 5.2.1.]

In addition, recognizing that a mid-term business plan (*chuuki keiei keikaku*) is a commitment to shareholders, if the board and the management have created and disclosed a plan, they should do their best to achieve the plan. Should the company fail to deliver on its mid-term business plan, the reasons underlying the failure of achievement as well as the company's actions should be fully analyzed, an appropriate explanation should be given to shareholders, and analytic findings should be reflected in a plan for the ensuing years. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance, partially adjusted: The current Supplementary Principle 4.1.2]

Supplementary Principles

4.1.1 ~~The board should clearly specify its own decisions as well as both the scope and content of the matters delegated to the management, and disclose a brief summary thereof.~~ **[Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]**

4.1.2 ~~Recognizing that a mid-term business plan (*chuuiki keiei keikaku*) is a commitment to shareholders, the board and the senior management should do their best to achieve the plan. Should the company fail to deliver on its mid-term business plan, the reasons underlying the failure of achievement as well as the company's actions should be fully analyzed, an appropriate explanation should be given to shareholders, and analytic findings should be reflected in a plan for the ensuing years.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4-1 after partially adjusting: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4-1 to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes specific examples of setting strategic directions for companies' business strategies (Principle 4.1).]**

4.1.3 ~~Based on the company objectives (business principles, etc.) and specific business strategies, the board should proactively engage in the establishment and implementation of a succession plan for the CEO and other top executives and appropriately oversee the systematic development of succession candidates, deploying sufficient time and resources.~~ **[Upgraded to Principle 4.3: Appropriate to be stated in Principle 4.3 along with election and dismissal of the CEO.]**

Principle 4.2 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board II(2): Establishing Environment for Supporting Appropriate Risk-taking

- (1)** ~~The board should view the establishment of an environment that supports appropriate risk-taking by the senior management as a major aspect of its roles and responsibilities. It should welcome proposals from the management based on healthy entrepreneurship, fully examine such proposals from an independent and objective standpoint with the aim of securing accountability, and support timely and decisive decision-making by the senior management when approved plans are implemented.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4-2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4-2 to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle shows a desirable**

standpoint for the board when establishing an environment for supporting appropriate risk-taking.]

(2) The board should persistently review whether the allocation of the company's business resources is appropriate in light of its disclosed business strategy and business plan created with the aim of achieving growth. [Added, combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Regarding allocation of business resources, current Principles 4.2.2, 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized in Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance.]

(3) Also, the remuneration of the management should include appropriate incentives to increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term such that it reflects mid- to long-term business results and potential risks, as well as promotes healthy entrepreneurship. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4.2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.2 to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes the perspectives of incentive remuneration.]

Interpretive Guidance

The board should view the establishment of an environment that supports appropriate risk-taking by the management as a major aspect of its roles and responsibilities. It should welcome proposals from the management based on healthy entrepreneurship, fully examine such proposals from an independent and objective standpoint with the aim of securing accountability, and support timely and decisive decision-making by the management when approved plans are implemented. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: Principle 4.2.]

Based on its business strategies and plans, the board should persistently review the allocation of company business resources that support appropriate risk-taking and that lead to sustainable growth and increased corporate value over the mid- to long-term, including whether business resources, such as financial assets like cash and real assets, are is-utilized efficiently in growth investments. [Added: Responsibilities of the board for appropriate allocation of business resources.] The board should effectively supervise the allocation of business resources and the implementation of business portfolio strategies to ensure that they contribute to the sustainable growth of the company. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: Supplementary Principle 4.2.2.]

Also, the board should design management remuneration systems through objective and transparent procedures and determine specific amount of remuneration accordingly.

In doing so, the proportion of management remuneration linked to mid- to long-term results and the balance of cash and stock should be set appropriately, reflecting mid- to long-term business results and potential risks, as well as promoting healthy entrepreneurship. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: Principles 4.2, 4.2.1.]

Supplementary Principle

~~4.2.1—The board should design management remuneration systems such that they operate as a healthy incentive to generate sustainable growth, and determine actual remuneration amounts appropriately through objective and transparent procedures. The proportion of management remuneration linked to mid- to long-term results and the balance of cash and stock should be set appropriately.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4-2: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4-2 to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes specific measures for appropriate incentives.]

~~4.2.2—The board should develop a basic policy for the company's sustainability initiatives from the perspective of increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term.~~ [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue : Provisions related to sustainability (current Principles 2.3, 2.3.1, 3.1.3 (front part) and 4.2.2 (front part) are combined and organized in the newly added Principle 4.5 and its Interpretive Guidance (please see the reasons for the current Principles 2.3 and 2.3.1).]

~~In addition, in light of the importance of investments in human capital and intellectual properties, the board should effectively supervise the allocation of management resources, including such investments, and the implementation of business portfolio strategies to ensure that they contribute to the sustainable growth of the company.~~ [Added, combined and organized provisions covering the same issue : Regarding allocation of business resources, Principles 3.1.3 (front part), 4.2.2, 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized in current Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance.]

Principle 4.3 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board III(3): Effective Oversight of the Management and Directors (i)

(1) The board should ~~view the effective oversight of the management and directors,~~

from an independent and objective standpoint, ~~as a major aspect of its roles and responsibilities. It should~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4-3: **Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4-3 to promote implementation in substance, as it includes the perspectives of oversight of the management and directors.**] appropriately evaluate company performance and reflect the evaluation in its assessment of the ~~senior~~ management including appointment/dismissal of the management according to objective, timely and transparent procedures. [Upgraded to Principle: **The current Supplementary Principles of 4.3.1.**]

Especially, regarding the appointment/dismissal of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the board should,[Upgraded to Principle: **The current Supplementary Principles of 4.3.2.**] based on the company objectives (e.g., business principles) and specific business strategies, proactively engage in the establishment and implementation of a succession plan for the CEO and appropriately oversee that the development of succession candidates and appointment of a qualified CEO are strategically carried out by deploying sufficient time and resources. [Upgraded to Principle: **The current Supplementary Principles of 4.1.3.**] The board should establish objective, timely, and transparent procedures such that a CEO is dismissed when it is determined, via an appropriate evaluation of the company's business results, that the CEO is not adequately fulfilling the CEO's responsibilities. [Upgraded to Principle: **The current Supplementary Principles of 4.3.3.**]

(2) ~~In addition,~~ The board should engage in oversight activities in order to ensure timely and accurate information disclosure. ~~engage in oversight activities in order to ensure timely and accurate information disclosure, and should establish appropriate internal control and enterprise risk management systems. Also, the board should be responsible for ensuring and establishing an appropriate framework for whistleblowing and should oversight its operation.~~

(3) ~~Also,~~ The board should appropriately deal with any conflict of interests that may arise between the company and its related parties, including the management and controlling shareholders. Regarding transactions between the company and its related parties, the board should establish appropriate procedures beforehand in proportion to the importance and characteristics of the transaction. In addition to their use by the board in monitoring (including approving) such transactions, these procedures should be disclosed. [Combined and organized provisions

covering the same issue : the current Principle 1.7]

Interpretive Guidance

The board's major roles and responsibilities from an independent and objective standpoint include effective oversight of the management and directors such as deciding appointment/dismissal of management, timely and accurate information disclosure establishing systems of internal control and risk management, and managing related party transactions. **[Added]**

The selection of core management members is the foundation of effective corporate governance. In particular, appointment/dismissal of a CEO is one of the most important strategic corporate decisions to be made. Accordingly, in order to ensure that appropriate talents are appointed to management including the CEO, Given such importance, the board should establish objective, timely and transparent procedures, and monitor whether appointments/dismissals of management are consistent with these procedures.

[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Also, the establishment of effective internal control and proactive enterprise risk management systems is not only important for mitigating risks and sustaining trust, it also has the potential of supporting management in decisive risk-taking. The board should appropriately establish such systems on an enterprise basis and oversee their operational status in addition to utilizing the internal audit department. Responses to cybersecurity risk, supply chain disruption risk due to geopolitical factors such as changes in the global economic security environment and the risk of leakage of information such as technology could also lead to profit opportunities. These risks could be included in the factors to be considered when establishing a risk management system, and responses to these risks should be appropriately conducted.

Companies should establish an appropriate framework for whistleblowing such that employees can report illegal or inappropriate behavior, disclosures, or any other serious concerns without fear of suffering from disadvantageous treatment. As a part of establishing a framework for whistleblowing, in order to objectively review and appropriately utilize information or allegations provided, companies should establish a point of contact that is independent of the management (for example, a panel consisting

~~of outside directors¹¹ and outside *kansayaku*¹²). In addition, rules should be established to secure the confidentiality of the information provider and prohibit any disadvantageous treatment.~~

~~In order to ensure effective, independent and objective oversight of the management by the board, companies should consider utilizing directors (i.e., non-executive directors) who are neither involved in business execution nor have close ties with the management.~~

Supplementary Principles

~~4.3.1—The board should ensure that the appointment and dismissal of the senior management are based on highly transparent and fair procedures via an appropriate evaluation of the company's business results. [Upgraded to Principle 4.3: Remains important as items related to appointment and dismissal of the CEOs.]~~

~~4.3.2—Because the appointment/dismissal of the CEO is the most important strategic decision for a company, the board should appoint a qualified CEO through objective, timely, and transparent procedures, deploying sufficient time and resources. [Upgraded to Principle 4.3: Remains important as items related to appointment and dismissal of the CEOs.]~~

~~4.3.3—The board should establish objective, timely, and transparent procedures such that a CEO is dismissed when it is determined, via an appropriate evaluation of the company's business results, that the CEO is not adequately fulfilling the CEO's responsibilities. [Upgraded to Principle 4.3: Remains important as items related to appointment and dismissal of the CEOs.]~~

~~4.3.4—The establishment of effective internal control and proactive enterprise risk management systems has the potential to support sound risk taking. The board~~

¹¹ ~~Outside director: A director who satisfies certain requirements such as not holding specific positions, including the position of executive director, in the company or its subsidiaries (Article 2, Paragraph 15 of the Companies Act). Furthermore, matters such as not holding a specific position in the parent company or other subsidiaries and not having specific kinship ties with controlling shareholders is also required for outside directors under the Companies Act.~~

¹² ~~Outside *kansayaku*: A *kansayaku* who satisfies certain requirements such as not holding specific positions, including the position of director, in the company or its subsidiaries (Article 2, Paragraph 16 of the Companies Act). Furthermore, matters such as not holding a specific position in the parent company or other subsidiaries and not having specific kinship ties with controlling shareholders is also required for outside *kansayaku* under the Companies Act.~~

~~should appropriately establish such systems on an enterprise basis and oversee the operational status, besides utilizing the internal audit department.~~ [Moved to **Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4.4 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.3):** Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.4 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.3) to promote implementation in substance, as it includes specific measures for implementation of establishing internal control and risk management systems (Principle 4.4 (the content of which is moved from the current 4.3)).]

Principle 4.4 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board III: Effective Oversight of Management and Directors (ii)

The board should establish appropriate internal control and enterprise risk management systems. [Part of current Principle 4.3]

Interpretive Guidance

The establishment of effective internal control and proactive enterprise risk management systems is not only important for mitigating risks and sustaining trust, but it also has the potential of supporting management in decisive risk-taking. The board should appropriately establish such systems on an enterprise basis and oversee their operational status in addition to utilizing the internal audit department. [Moved to **Interpretive Guidance, partially adjusted: Principle 4.3.4]** Responses to cybersecurity risk, supply chain disruption risk due to geopolitical factors, such as changes in the global economic security environment, and the risk of leakage of technological and other information could also lead to profit opportunities. These risks could be included in the factors to be considered when establishing a risk management system, and responses to these risks should be appropriately conducted. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Principle 4.54 Roles and Responsibilities of the Board IV(4): Sustainability Measures

The board should address sustainability matters positively and proactively in terms of increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term. Also, the board should develop a basic policy for the company's sustainability initiatives and take appropriate measures. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The current Principles 2.3, 2.3.1 and front part of 4.2.2.]

Interpretive Guidance

Recently Sustainability (mid- to long-term sustainability including ESG factors) is an important management issue. From the perspective of assessing mid- to long-term corporate value, the importance of sustainability-related information is growing globally. The International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) has formulated a global sustainability disclosure standard (ISSB Standards), and there has been progress in countries' implementation of the sustainability disclosure standard. Meanwhile, it is important for Japanese companies to further promote positive and proactive responses to sustainability issues. **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue, updated reflecting recent developments: The current General Principle 2 Notes.]**

The board should recognize that dealing with sustainability issue, such as taking care of climate change and other global environmental issues, respect of human rights, fair and appropriate treatment of the workforce including caring for their health and working environment, crisis management for natural disasters, and diversity are important management issues that can lead to earning opportunities as well as risk mitigation, and should take appropriate measures to address these issues. **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The current Principles 2.3 and 2.3.1.]**

Principle 4.6⁵⁴ Roles and Responsibilities of *Kansayaku* and the *Kansayaku* Board

Kansayaku and the *kansayaku* board should bear in mind their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders and make decisions from an independent and objective standpoint when executing their roles and responsibilities ~~including the audit of the performance of directors' duties, appointment and dismissal of *kansayaku* and external auditors, and the determination of auditor remuneration.~~ **[Substantially stated in the latter part of this Principle.]**

~~Although so-called "defensive functions," such as business and accounting audits, are part of the roles and responsibilities expected of *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board, in order to fully perform their duties, it would not be appropriate for *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board to interpret the scope of their function too narrowly, and~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision includes perspectives of roles and responsibilities of *Kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board (Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised)).], and they should**

positively and proactively exercise their rights and express their views at board meetings and to the management.

Interpretive Guidance

Although so-called “defensive functions,” such as business and accounting audits, are part of the roles and responsibilities expected of *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board, in order to fully perform their duties, it would not be appropriate for *kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board to interpret the scope of their function too narrowly. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised).]**

kansayaku or the *kansayaku* board should secure cooperation with outside directors so that such directors can strengthen their capacity to collect information without having their independence jeopardized. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Supplementary Principle 4.4.1.]**

Supplementary Principle

4.4.1—~~Given that not less than half of the *kansayaku* board must be composed of outside *kansayaku* and that at least one full-time *kansayaku* must be appointed in accordance with the Companies Act, the *kansayaku* board should, from the perspective of fully executing its roles and responsibilities, increase its effectiveness through an organizational combination of the independence of the former and the information gathering power of the latter.~~ **[Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]**~~In addition, *kansayaku* or the *kansayaku* board should secure cooperation with outside directors so that such directors can strengthen their capacity to collect information without having their independence jeopardized.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this provision includes examples of roles and responsibilities of *Kansayaku* and the *kansayaku* board (Principle 4.4 (Principle 4.6 as revised)).]**

Principle 4.5 Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors and *Kansayaku*

~~With due attention to their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders, the directors, *kansayaku* and the management of companies should secure the appropriate~~

~~cooperation with stakeholders and act in the interest of the company and the common interests of its shareholders.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of General Principle 4, partially revised: Appropriate to partially revise and categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 4 to promote implementation in substance, as this provision prescribes fiduciary responsibilities of directors and *kansayaku* which are the basis of Responsibilities of the board (General Principle 4).]

~~Principle 4.6 Business Execution and Oversight of the Management~~

~~In order to ensure effective, independent and objective oversight of the management by the board, companies should consider utilizing directors who are neither involved in business execution nor have close ties with the management.~~ [Removed: Widely accepted and implemented in practice.]

Principle 4.76 Use of Optional Approaches

In adopting the most appropriate organizational structure (as stipulated by the Companies Act) that is suitable for a company's specific characteristics, companies should employ optional approaches, as necessary, to further enhance governance functions. [Moved from the current Principle 4.10.]

In particular, if the organizational structure of a company is either Company with *Kansayaku* Board or Company with Supervisory Committee and independent directors do not compose a majority of the board, the company should establish an independent nomination committee and remuneration committee under the board, comprised primarily of independent directors, and seek appropriate involvement and advice from the committees. [Upgraded to Principle, partially adjusted: The current Principle 4.10.1 front part]

Companies listed on the Prime Market should basically have the majority of the members of each committee be independent directors¹³, and should disclose the mandates and roles of the committees, as well as the policy regarding the independence of the composition. [Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle

¹³ Independent director: The listing rules of securities exchanges provide that the outside directors, as defined in the Companies Act, are independent directors where they satisfy independence criteria of securities exchanges and the company determines that they do not have the possibility of conflicts of interest with its shareholders.

4.10.1 (latter part).]

Interpretive Guidance

The ideal state of the board can vary depending on the characteristics of each company. Companies should adopt the optimal organizational structure best suited to their specific situation, while effectively utilizing optional committees, such as nomination committees and remuneration committees, to further strengthen their governance framework.

[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

~~If the organizational structure of a company is either Company with *Kansayaku* Board or Company with Supervisory Committee and independent directors do not compose a majority of the board, in order to strengthen the independence, objectivity and accountability of board functions on the matters of nomination (including succession plan) and remuneration of the management and directors, the formation of nomination committee and remuneration committee is important. the company should seek A nomination committee and remuneration committee should have the responsibilities of appropriately involvement and providing advice to the board from the committees, including from the perspective of gender and other diversity and skills, in the examination of such important matters as nominations and remuneration by establishing an independent nomination committee and remuneration committee under the board, to which such committees make significant contributions.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance, partially adjusted: From the current Supplementary Principle 4.10.1 (front part).]

Principle 4.87 Roles and Responsibilities of Independent Directors

Companies should make effective use of independent directors¹⁴, taking into consideration the expectations listed below with respect to their roles and responsibilities:

- i) ~~Provision of advice on business policies and business improvement based on their knowledge and experience with the aim to promote sustainable corporate growth and increase corporate value over the mid to long term;~~ [Moved to (4) below to emphasize importance of monitoring for the functions of

¹⁴ Independent director: The listing rules of securities exchanges provide that the outside directors, as defined in the Companies Act, are independent directors where they satisfy independence criteria of securities exchanges and the company determines that they do not have the possibility of conflicts of interest with its shareholders.

independent directors.]

- (1) Monitoring of the management through important decision-making at the board including the appointment/~~and~~ dismissal of the ~~senior~~ management;
- (2) Monitoring of conflicts of interest between the company and the management or controlling shareholders; ~~and~~
- (3) Appropriately representing the views of minority shareholders and other stakeholders in the boardroom from a standpoint independent of the management and controlling shareholders; ~~and~~
- (4) Provision of advice on business policies and business improvement based on their knowledge and experience with the aim to promote sustainable corporate growth and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term.; **[Moved from the current (i).]**

Interpretive Guidance

Independent directors are expected to proactively perform important roles and responsibilities primarily relating to matters indicated in (1) through (4) of this Principle based on an independent and objective standpoint from the management and controlling shareholders.

For example, independent directors should put effort into reflecting the views of minority shareholders in the boardroom through directly holding dialogues with shareholders as necessary. Also, by building a trusting and candid relationship with the management, in normal times, independent directors should delegate business execution to the management and carry out strategic discussions and decision-making via monitoring and provision of advice. If independent directors cannot agree with an explanation provided by the management, it is necessary that they express opposing opinions in order to appropriately perform their roles and responsibilities. Further, independent directors should perform their roles and responsibilities, including by proactively making contribution in a nomination committee and remuneration committee, in mitigating management bias and ensuring that the appointment/dismissal of CEOs and management (including a succession plan) and remunerations are appropriate from the perspective of increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term in accordance with objective, timely and transparent procedures. In companies with controlling shareholders, the roles and responsibilities of independent directors are particularly important due to the structural conflict of interests between the management/controlling shareholders and

minority shareholders.

On the other hand, in emergencies such as deteriorating business performance, the handling of misconduct, and corporate takeovers, independent directors should act to protect the common interests of shareholders and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term by utilizing their independent standpoint from the management, and if the management has a conflict of interests, by appropriately making judgement as a decision maker and fulfilling their accountability. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Principle 4.98 Ensuring the Expertise of Independent Directors

The board should select candidates for independent director who have sufficient expertise to fulfill their roles and responsibilities in contributing to the sustainable growth of the company and increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term, such as those who are expected to contribute to frank, active and constructive discussions at board meetings. [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: The part “fulfill their roles and responsibilities in contributing to the sustainable growth of the company and increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term” is referred from the current wording of Principle 4.8 (front part). The part “who are expected to contribute to frank, active and constructive discussions at board meetings” is moved from Principle 4.9 (latter part). On a side note, due to importance of ensuring the expertise of independent directors to fulfill its roles and responsibilities, combined and organized the current Principle 4.8 (partial) and 4.9 (latter part), then established a new independent Principle.]

Interpretive Guidance

In order for independent directors to effectively and appropriately fulfill their roles and responsibilities, it is necessary to appoint a certain number of independent directors who have sufficient expertise. The objective and independent standpoint of independent directors ensures the credibility and fairness of their roles and responsibilities. Of these, this Principle is relevant to the expertise of each independent director, which is the basis for the board to appropriately fulfill their roles and responsibilities.

The board could consider what kind of candidate would be qualified for fulfilling the roles and responsibilities in contributing to the sustainable growth of the company and increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term, taking into account company objectives (e.g., business principles) and specific business strategies. Then, the board

could establish a standard with respect to necessary expertise such as insights, skills and experience in order to appoint appropriate independent directors. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Principle 4.1098 – ~~Effective Use of~~ Securing Sufficient Number of Independent Directors

Companies should appoint independent directors who have sufficient expertise to ~~should~~ fulfill their roles and responsibilities with the aim of contributing to sustainable growth of companies and increasing corporate value over the mid- to long-term. Companies listed on the Prime Market should therefore appoint at least one-third of their directors as independent directors (two directors if listed on other markets) that sufficiently have ~~such qualities~~ sufficient expertise. [The current Principle 4.7 (Principle 4.8 as revised). Clarification based on the aims of the new Principle 4.9.]

Companies listed on the Prime Market with a controlling shareholder should appoint at least the majority ~~one-third~~ of their directors (one-third ~~the majority~~ of directors if listed on other markets and with a controlling shareholder ~~the Prime Market~~) as independent directors who are independent of the controlling shareholder. [Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.8.3 (front part).]

Irrespective of the above, if a company listed on the Prime Market believes it needs to appoint the majority of directors (at least one-third of directors if listed on other markets) as independent directors based on a broad consideration of factors such as the industry, company size, business characteristics, organizational structure and circumstances surrounding the company, it should appoint a sufficient number of independent directors.

Interpretive Guidance

This Principle relates to the “number” of independent directors, which is a necessary element for independent directors to appropriately and effectively fulfill their roles and responsibilities. Although this Principle expects companies to appoint a certain percentage/number of independent directors, it is important to note that merely securing a certain number of independent directors would not immediately result in the fulfillment of the roles and responsibilities of independent directors. Securing independent directors with necessary expertise is the basis for fulfilment. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Companies listed on the Prime Market with a controlling shareholder could select to establish a special committee composed of independent persons including independent director(s) to deliberate and review material transactions or actions that conflict with the interests of the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, in lieu of appointing at least the majorityone-third of their directors (one-third the majority of directors if listed on other markets and with a controlling shareholderthe Prime Market) as independent directors who are independent of the controlling shareholder, if they consider it appropriate. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: The current Supplementary Principle 4.8.3 (latter part).]

It is also desirable that companies, which do not have a controlling shareholder, but have a shareholder with substantial control, take the approach in accordance with the aim of this Principle. [Added: The importance of independent directors is elevated in such listed companies.]

Supplementary Principles

~~4.8.1—In order to actively contribute to discussions at the board, independent directors should endeavor to exchange information and develop a shared awareness among themselves from an independent and objective standpoint.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of newly added Principle 4.12: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.12 to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes examples of measures for information gathering by independent directors (newly added Principle 4.12).] ~~Regular meetings consisting solely of independent directors (executive sessions) would be one way of achieving this.~~ [Upgraded to newly added Principle 4.12: r remains important as a provision related to effective independent directors, along with relevant part of the current Supplementary Principle 4.8.2.]

~~4.8.2—Independent directors should endeavor to establish a framework for communicating with the management and for cooperating with *kansayaku* or the *kansayaku* board by,~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of newly added Principle 4.12: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.12 to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes examples of measures for effective independent directors (newly added Principle 4.12).] ~~for example, appointing the lead independent director~~

~~from among themselves.~~ [Upgraded to newly added Principle 4.12: remains important as a provision related to effective independent directors, along with relevant part of the current Supplementary Principle 4.8.1.]

~~4.8.3—Companies that have a controlling shareholder should either appoint at least one-third of their directors (the majority of directors if listed on the Prime Market) as independent directors who are independent of the controlling shareholder or~~ [Upgraded to the current Principle 4.8 (Principle 4.10 as revised): remains important as a provision related to the number of independent directors.] ~~establish a special committee composed of independent persons including independent director(s) to deliberate and review material transactions or actions that conflict with the interests of the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.8 (Principle 4.10 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to the current Principle 4.8 (Principle 4.10 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes alternative option of appointing a certain ratio of their directors as independent directors (the current 4.8.3 to be upgraded to the current Principle 4.8 (Principle 4.10 as revised)).]

Principle 4.11109 Ensuring Independence of Standards and Qualification for Independent Directors

Boards should establish ~~and disclose~~ [Removed: Overlaps with disclosure requirements for annual securities report.] independence standards aimed at securing effective independence of independent directors, taking into consideration the independence criteria set by securities exchanges. ~~The board should endeavor to select independent director candidates who are expected to contribute to frank, active and constructive discussions at board meetings.~~ [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Combined and organized Principle 4.8 (front part, partially) and 4.9 (latter part) under newly added Principle 4.9 from the perspective of ensuring expertise of independent directors.]

Interpretive Guidance

Ensuring the “independence” of independent directors secures the credibility and

fairness of their roles and responsibilities, assuming that their expertise and the number of independent directors are sufficient.

In order to appoint independent directors who are objectively independent, the board should establish ~~and disclose~~ an objective independence standard for effectively determining that there is no potential conflict of interest between an independent director and general shareholders, such as if the independent director is associated with another entity with certain capital and business ties with the company, there being no potential influence from the associated entities. ~~of the independent director.~~ **[Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]**

Principle 4.1244 Effective Functioning of Independent Directors

Independent directors should endeavor to exchange information and develop a shared awareness among themselves from an independent and objective standpoint.

[Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.8.1.]

Independent directors should endeavor to establish a framework for communicating and coordinating with the management and for cooperating with *kansayaku* or the *kansayaku* board. **[Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.8.2.]**

Interpretive Guidance

Independent directors could hold regular meetings consisting solely of independent directors (executive sessions) to exchange information and develop a shared awareness and to contribute proactively to discussions in the boardroom from the perspective of an objective and independent standpoint. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance: From the current Supplementary Principle 4.8.1.]** Also for communicating and coordinating with the management and for cooperating with *kansayaku* or the *kansayaku* board, for example, appointing a director who is primarily in charge of communication, coordination and cooperation (the “Lead Independent Director”) from among themselves is one option. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance and partially revised: The current Supplementary Principle 4.8.2. Appropriate to suggest “Lead Independent Director” as an example while indicating its substantial functions.]**

Principle 4.10 Use of Optional Approach

~~In adopting the most appropriate organizational structure (as stipulated by the Companies Act) that is suitable for a company's specific characteristics, companies should employ optional approaches, as necessary, to further enhance governance functions. [Moved to New Principle 4.7]~~

Supplementary Principle

~~4.10.1 If the organizational structure of a company is either Company with *Kansayaku* Board or Company with Supervisory Committee and independent directors do not compose a majority of the board, in order to strengthen the independence, objectivity and accountability of board functions on the matters of nomination (including succession plan) and remuneration of the senior management and directors, the company should seek appropriate involvement and advice from the committees, including from the perspective of gender and other diversity and skills, in the examination of such important matters as nominations and remuneration by establishing an independent nomination committee and remuneration committee under the board, to which such committees make significant contributions. [Partially moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.10 (Principle 4.7 as revised): Since disclosure related to independence of optional committees (the current Principle 4.10.1 latter part) is upgraded to the Principle, the basis thereof is upgraded to a Principle. Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.10 (Principle 4.7 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes the purpose and objectives of the use of optional approach (the current Principle 4.10 (4.7 as revised)).]~~

~~In particular, companies listed on the Prime Market should basically have the majority of the members of each committee be independent directors, and should disclose the mandates and roles of the committees, as well as the policy regarding the independence of the composition. [Upgraded to the current Principle 4.10 (4.7 as revised): Remains important as disclosure regarding independence of voluntary committees.]~~

Principle 4.13121 Preconditions for Board and *Kansayaku* Board Effectiveness

(1) The board should be well balanced in knowledge, experience and skills in

order to fulfill its roles and responsibilities, and it should be constituted in a manner to achieve both diversity, including gender, international experience, careerwork experience, ~~and~~ age, cultural background, and appropriate size. The board should identify necessary skills that it should have in light of business strategies and disclose the combination of skills that each director possesses in an appropriate form according to the business environment and business characteristics, along with policies and procedures for nominating directors.

[Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.11.1.]

(2) ~~In addition, p~~Persons with appropriate experience and skills as well as necessary knowledge on finance, accounting, and the law should be appointed as *kansayaku*. In particular, at least one person who has sufficient expertise on finance and accounting should be appointed as *kansayaku*. When doing so, At least one person independent director(s) with management experience in other companies should be included in independent directors. **[Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.11.1.]**

(3) The board should annually endeavor to improve its function by analyzing and evaluating effectiveness of the board as a whole, and should disclose a summary of the results. **[Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.11.3.]**

Interpretive Guidance

The board should identify the skills that are needed to perform its roles and responsibilities, and execute and implement its business strategies and business plans. Also, the board should consider the appropriate balance between knowledge, experience and skills of the board as a whole, as well as diversity and appropriate board size. **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance and partially revised: The current Supplementary Principle 4.11.1.]** Then, the board should make disclosure in accordance with the aim of this Principle, for example, "skills matrix" that lists knowledge, experience and skills of each director. **[Added: Clarified that the board should make disclosure in accordance with the aim of this Principle.]**

Outside directors, outside *kansayaku*, and other directors and *kansayaku* should devote sufficient time and effort required to appropriately fulfill their respective roles and responsibilities. Therefore, where directors and *kansayaku* also serve as directors, *kansayaku* or the management at other companies, such positions should be limited to a reasonable number ~~and disclosed each year.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance and**

partially revised: The current Supplementary Principle 4.11.2]

In addition, when evaluating the board effectiveness, it is beneficial to make evaluations that take into account how the board should function in order to fulfill their roles and responsibilities. While there are a variety of ways for making evaluations, for example, one option is for each director to make a self-evaluation and to evaluate the board as a whole. **[Added]**

Supplementary Principles

~~4.11.1 The board should identify the skills, etc. that it should have in light of its managing strategies, and have a view on the appropriate balance between knowledge, experience and skills of the board as a whole, and also on diversity and appropriate board size. Consistent with its view, the board should establish policies and procedures for nominating directors and disclose them along with the combination of skills, etc. that each director possesses in an appropriate form according to the business environment and business characteristics, etc., such as what is known as a "skills matrix."~~ **[Upgraded to the current Principle 4.11 (4.13 as revised) and moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.11 (4.13 as revised): With respect to disclosure of policies and procedures for nominating directors, upgraded as it remains important. With respect to examples, appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes specific examples of the preconditions of ensuring the board effectiveness (Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised)).]** ~~When doing so, independent director(s) with management experience in other companies should be included.~~ **[Upgraded to the current Principle 4.11 (4.13 as revised): remains important as the experience of independent directors is a precondition for the board effectiveness.]**

~~4.11.2 Outside directors, outside *kansayaku*, and other directors and *kansayaku* should devote sufficient time and effort required to appropriately fulfill their respective roles and responsibilities. Therefore, where directors and *kansayaku* also serve as directors, *kansayaku* or the management at other companies, such positions should be limited to a reasonable number~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as**

revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes specific examples of the preconditions for the board effectiveness (Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised)).] ~~and disclosed each year.~~ [Removed: With respect to disclosure of serving in multiple directorships, overlaps with disclosure items in business report, proxy statement of shareholder meeting and annual securities report.]

~~4.11.3 Each year the board should analyze and evaluate its effectiveness as a whole, taking into consideration the relevant matters, including the self-evaluations of each director.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the current Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised) and partially revised: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this part includes specific examples of ways of evaluation of effectiveness that is a precondition of ensuring the board effectiveness (the current Principle 4.11 (Principle 4.13 as revised)).] ~~A summary of the results should be disclosed.~~ [Upgraded to the current Principle 4.11 (4.13 as revised): evaluation of effectiveness remains important to ensure the board effectiveness (the current Principle 4.11 (4.13 as revised)).]

Principle 4.14~~13~~2 Active Board Deliberations

- (1) The board should endeavor to foster a climate where free, open and constructive discussions and exchanges of views take place, including the raising of concerns by outside directors.
- (2) ~~In order to fulfill their roles and responsibilities, directors and *kansayaku* should proactively collect information, and as necessary, request the company to provide them with additional information. Also, the board and the *kansayaku* board should verify whether information requested by directors and *kansayaku* is being provided smoothly.~~ [Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: To combine provisions regarding establishing support system for directors and *kansayaku* including human resources in department and function that support the board. Combined and organized the current 4.12 (4.14 as revised) and the current 4.13.]
- (3) ~~Companies should establish a support structure for directors and *kansayaku*, including providing sufficient staff.~~ [Combined and organized provisions

covering the same issue: To combine provisions regarding establishing support system for directors and kansayaku including human resources in department and function that support the board. Combined and organized the current 4.12 (4.14 as revised) and the current 4.14.]

Interpretive Guidance

For the board to sufficiently perform its roles and responsibilities, it is crucial that the substantial deliberation is held in the boardroom. The board is expected to proactively implement measures to promote substantial and active deliberation. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

The board should attempt to make deliberations active, for example, (i) sharing materials for the board meeting sufficiently in advance of the meeting date, (ii) providing sufficient information as necessary in addition to board materials to directors by the company (where appropriate, the information should be organized and/or analyzed to promote easy understanding), (iii) determining in advance the schedule of board meetings for the current year and anticipated agenda items, (iv) setting appropriately the number of agenda items and the frequency of board meetings, and (v) securing sufficient time for deliberations. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: The current Supplementary Principle 4.12.1.]

In order to fulfill the roles and responsibilities of directors and kansayaku, it is essential that companies provide them with appropriate support, including responding to information requests made by directors and kansayaku. [Clarification of the aim of the Principle.]

Companies should ensure coordination between the internal audit department, directors and kansayaku by establishing a system in which the internal audit department appropriately reports directly to the board and the kansayaku board in order for them to fulfill their functions. [Moved to Interpretive Guidance: The current Supplementary Principle 4.13.3.]

Also, in order to make deliberations active and to provide appropriate support including the provision of information to directors and kansayaku, including outside directors and kansayaku, it is important to promote initiatives such as enhancing the functions of the board secretariat (e.g., corporate secretary) who supports the board. It is desirable that the board secretariat proactively operate board meetings not only to serve their administrative functions in operating meetings, including those listed in (i) through (v) above, but also so that the boardroom and each committee operate as effective forums for discussion by

setting appropriate agendas in light of the roles and responsibilities of the applicable meeting body. Also, as necessary, the board secretariat is expected to take on the role of communicating and coordinating with internal divisions of the company in order to appropriately provide company information when requested by outside directors and outside *kansayaku*. [Added: Statement regarding an example of functions of the board secretariat (corporate secretary).]

In addition, the functions of the board secretariat are considered to be particularly important when an independent director serves as the chair of the board, or when the ratio of outside directors on the board is significant.[Added: Statement regarding desirable functions of the board secretariat (corporate secretary).]

Supplementary Principle

~~4.12.1 The board should ensure the following in relation to the operation of board meetings and should attempt to make deliberations active:~~

- ~~i) Materials for board meetings are distributed sufficiently in advance of the meeting date;~~
- ~~ii) In addition to board materials and as necessary, sufficient information is provided to directors by the company (where appropriate, the information should be organized and/or analyzed to promote easy understanding);~~
- ~~iii) The schedule of board meetings for the current year and anticipated agenda items are determined in advance;~~
- ~~iv) The number of agenda items and the frequency of board meetings are set appropriately; and~~
- ~~v) Sufficient time for deliberations.~~ [Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the

current Principle 4.12 (Principle 4.14 as revised): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.12 (Principle 4.14 as revised) to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes specific examples of active board deliberation.]

Principle 4.13 Information Gathering and Support Structure

~~In order to fulfill their roles and responsibilities, directors and *kansayaku* should proactively collect information, and as necessary, request the company to provide them with additional information.~~

~~Also, companies should establish a support structure for directors and *kansayaku*, including providing sufficient staff.~~

~~The board and the *kansayaku* board should verify whether information requested by directors and *kansayaku* is provided smoothly.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Combined and organized the current Principle 4.12 (Principle 4.14 as revised) and the current Principle 4.13 which discuss support structure for directors and *kansayaku* including an internal department to support the board.]**

Supplementary Principles

~~4.13.1 Directors, including outside directors, should request the company to provide them with additional information, where deemed necessary from the perspective of contributing to transparent, fair, timely and decisive decision-making. In addition, *kansayaku*, including outside *kansayaku*, should collect information appropriately, including the use of their statutory investigation power.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with the revised Principle 4.14 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.13).]**

~~4.13.2—Directors and *kansayaku* should consider consulting with external specialists at company expense, where they deem it necessary.~~ **[Removed: Overlaps with the revised Principle 4.14 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.13).]**

~~4.13.3—Companies should ensure coordination between the internal audit department, directors and *kansayaku* by establishing a system in which the internal audit department appropriately reports directly to the board and the *kansayaku* board in order for them to fulfill their functions. In addition, companies should take measures to adequately provide necessary information to outside directors and outside *kansayaku*. One example would be the appointment of an individual who is responsible for communicating and handling requests within the company such that the requests for information about the company by outside directors and outside *kansayaku* are appropriately processed.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of the Principle 4.14 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.13): Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.14 (the content of which is moved from the current Principle 4.13) to promote implementation in substance, as this Principle includes specific examples of information gathering by directors and *kansayaku* (the content of which is moved**

from the current Principle 4.13).]

Principle 4.15¹⁴ Director and *Kansayaku* Training

~~New and incumbent~~ [Removed] Directors and *kansayaku* should deepen their understanding of their roles and responsibilities as a critical governance body at a company, and should endeavor to acquire and update necessary knowledge and skills on the company's business, finance, and organization. [Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.14.1] Accordingly, companies should provide and arrange training opportunities suitable to each director and *kansayaku* along with financial support for associated expenses and should disclose their training policy for directors and *kansayaku*. [Upgraded to Principle: The current Supplementary Principle 4.14.2.] The board should verify whether such opportunities and support are appropriately provided.

Supplementary Principles

~~4.14.1 Directors and *kansayaku*, including outside directors and outside *kansayaku*, should be given the opportunity when assuming their position to acquire necessary knowledge on the company's business, finances, organization and other matters; [Upgraded to the current Principle 4.14 (Principle 4.15 as revised): Remains important as this part outlines the content of necessary knowledge that directors and *kansayaku* should acquire.] and fully understand the roles and responsibilities, including legal liabilities, expected of them. Incumbent directors should also be given a continuing opportunity to renew and update such knowledge as necessary. [Removed: Overlaps with the current Principle 4.14 (Principle 4.15 as revised).]~~

~~4.14.2 Companies should disclose their training policy for directors and *kansayaku*. [Upgraded to the current Principle 4.14 (Principle 4.15 as revised): Remains important as this part outlines disclosure of training policy for directors and *kansayaku*.]~~

Section 5: Dialogue with Shareholders

[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Combined and organized section 1 and 5 from the perspectives of (i) organizing section 1 as provisions relevant to shareholders and section 2 as provisions relevant to stakeholders other than shareholders, and (ii) combining and organizing it into the opening chapter in light of the importance of dialogue with shareholders.]

General Principle 5

~~In order to contribute to sustainable growth and the increase of corporate value over the mid- to long-term, companies should engage in constructive dialogue with shareholders even outside the general shareholder meeting.~~ [Moved to General Principle 1.]

~~During such dialogue, senior management and directors, including outside directors, should listen to the views of shareholders and pay due attention to their interests and concerns, clearly explain business policies to shareholders in an understandable manner so as to gain their support, and work for developing a balanced understanding of the positions of shareholders and other stakeholders and acting accordingly.~~ [Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 1: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to General Principle 1 to promote implementation in substance, as it includes the purpose of constructive dialogue with shareholders (the front part of this General Principle which is moved to General Principle 1).]

Notes

~~With the establishment of Japan's Stewardship Code, institutional investors are encouraged to engage in purposeful dialogue (engagement) based on the in-depth knowledge of investee companies and their business environment.~~ [Moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 1.]

~~Regularly engaging in dialogue with shareholders to gain their understanding of specific business strategies and business plans and taking appropriate action when there are concerns are extraordinarily useful for companies to strengthen the foundations of management legitimacy and support their efforts to generate sustainable growth. Although the management and directors have opportunities to interact and exchange~~

~~views with employees, business partners and financial institutions on a daily basis, these stakeholders are all creditors. In contrast, the management and directors typically have limited interactions with shareholders. If the senior management and directors give due attention to the views of shareholders through dialogue, they can absorb views and analyses of business management from the perspective of capital providers. Dialogue with shareholders should also inspire healthy entrepreneurship in the management and directors and thereby contribute to sustainable corporate growth.~~ **[Shorted and moved to Notes (Interpretive Guidance as revised) of General Principle 1.]**

Principle 5.1 Policy for Constructive Dialogue with Shareholders

~~Companies should, positively and to the extent reasonable, respond to the requests from shareholders to engage in dialogue (management meetings) so as to support sustainable growth and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term. The board should establish, approve and disclose policies concerning the measures and organizational structures aimed at promoting constructive dialogue with shareholders.~~

[Moved to newly added Principle 1.1.]

Supplementary Principles

~~5.1.1—Taking the requests and interests of shareholders into consideration, to the extent reasonable, the senior management, directors, including outside directors, and *kansayaku*, should have a basic position to engage in dialogue (management meetings) with shareholders.~~ **[Upgraded to newly added Principle 1.1: Remains important as a provision relevant to dialogue with shareholders.]**

~~5.1.2—At minimum, policies for promoting constructive dialogue with shareholders should include the following:~~

- ~~i)—Appointing a member of the management or a director who is responsible for overseeing and ensuring that constructive dialogue takes place, including the matters stated in items ii) to v) below;~~
- ~~ii)—Measures to ensure positive cooperation between internal departments such as investor relations, corporate planning, general affairs, corporate finance, accounting and legal affairs with the aim of supporting dialogue;~~
- ~~iii)—Measures to promote opportunities for dialogue aside from individual meetings (e.g., general investor meetings and other IR activities);~~
- ~~iv)—Measures to appropriately and effectively relay shareholder views and~~

~~concerns learned through dialogue to the senior management and the board; and~~

- v) ~~Measures to control insider information when engaging in dialogue.~~ **[Moved to Interpretive Guidance of newly added Principle 1.1: Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 1.1 to promote implementation in substance, as it includes specific examples for dialogue with shareholders (newly added Principle 1.1).]**

~~5.1.3 Companies should endeavor to identify their shareholder ownership structure as necessary, and it is desirable for shareholders to cooperate as much as possible in this process.~~ **[Removed: The front part is widely accepted and implemented in practice. The latter part overlaps with Japan's Stewardship Code (increasing the transparency of beneficial shareholders).]**

~~Principle 5.2 Establishing and Disclosing Business Strategies and Business Plans~~

~~When establishing and disclosing business strategies and business plans, companies should articulate their earnings plans and capital policies, and present targets for profitability and capital efficiency after accurately identifying the company's cost of capital. Also, companies should provide explanations that are clear and logical to shareholders with respect to the allocation of management resources, such as reviewing their business portfolio and investments in fixed assets, R&D, and human capital, and specific measures that will be taken in order to achieve their plans and targets.~~

[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issue: Concerning allocation of business resources, current Principles 3.1.3 (front part), 4.2.2 (latter part), 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized under Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance.]

~~Supplementary Principle~~

~~5.2.1 In formulating and announcing business strategies, etc., companies should clearly present the basic policy regarding the business portfolio decided by the board and the status of the review of such portfolio.~~ **[Combined and organized provisions covering the same issues /moved to Interpretive Guidance of Principle 4.1: Concerning allocation of business resources, current Principles 3.1.3 (front part), 4.2.2 (latter part), 5.2 and 5.2.1 are combined and organized under**

Principles 4.1, 4.2 and their Interpretive Guidance. Appropriate to categorize as supplementary guidance to Principle 4.1 to promote implementation in substance, as it includes examples of explanation upon establishing and disclosing business strategies and business plans (Principle 4.1).]