

# The Link between Competitiveness and SME Financing

Stijn Claessens, World Bank

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# Purpose of presentation

- Show a measure of competition for banking systems for a large cross-section of countries
- Identify factors explaining differences
- Policy implications for competition policy
- Show data on degree of SME financing
- Analyze drivers of SME financing across countries
  - Factors driving SME financing in general
  - The effects of competition on SME access
- Policy implications for SME access



# Motivation

- Competition is important in the financial sector
  - As in other sectors, competition affects efficiency, costs & incentives of financial institutions & markets to innovate
- Competition in finance, however, is complex, with tradeoffs
  - Structure matters, but in complex ways, e.g., effects of entry/exit rules, economies of scale/scope, networks, etc.
  - Too much competition can undermine stability, lead to crises
  - Access to credit depends on franchise value, but degree of competition can negatively and positively affect access
  - Financial services industries are continuously changing
    - Removal of barriers, globalization, increased role of non-banks, technological progress, increased networks
    - Affecting competitiveness and access




# Competitiveness tests

- While complications recognized, studies on competition in finance still at early stage, particularly cross-country
  - New thinking on functional approach to financial services not incorporated as institutions are often studied
  - Lack of cross-country data, although improving recently
  - Many approaches do not take a formal approach to measuring degree of competition in markets
- Theory so far relies largely on general contestability
  - Baumol, Panzar and Willig, etc.: market structure not or not only important factor in determining competition
  - Applied in similar ways to financial services industries
- Only some specific analysis, e.g., credit cards markets



# Competitiveness measure

H-Statistic (Pooled OLS)



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
# Determinants of competition

- Results suggest concentration and number of banks wrong measure for competition. Confirm IO that contestability rather than structure most important
- Concentrated banking system can be competitive
- Greater foreign bank presence, lack of activity restrictions → more competitive banking systems
  - Open to foreign entry & less restrictions important
- Some role of non-bank financial institutions in increasing competition policy
- However, large, unexplained variations. Country circumstances matter evidently a great deal



# Competitive landscape is changing

- Many changes in production and distribution of financial services, altering financial services industrial structures
  - Deregulations, including removal of barriers between markets and products. Rapid technological progress



# Implications for competition policy

- Theory and empirics: competition complicated. Importantly, need to consider financial services changes
- Traditionally: balance franchise value, important for prudential, special nature of banks, with competition
- More active competition policy possible and needed
  - Across institutions providing services & global: more competition
  - Finance and banks particularly less special → Reduction of safety net allows for more active competition policy
- Raising questions on competition paradigm
  - Do the newly emerging industrial structures require a different competition policy paradigm in the financial sector?
  - Can paradigm borrow from traditional IO or other (services)?
  - How to adapt to “special nature” of financial services industries?





# New paradigm needed

- New competition policy to combine three approaches
  - Institutional: assure contestable markets by entry/exit of institutions, domestic and cross-border (all GATS modes)
  - Functional: assure contestable markets by leveling playing field across similar financial products (in all dimensions)
    - Requires competition policy to be more harmonized: Horizontal/vertical and service-specific & Globally, WTO, FTA
  - Production: assure efficiently provided, equally accessible, affordable network services (information, distribution, settlement, clearing, payment, etc.)
- Yet will remain difficult
  - Market and product definition; Barriers to entry may arise from sunk costs, economies of scale and scope, externalities
  - Network effects exist in supply, demand or distribution sides



# Implications for competition policy

- Competition policy to resemble other network industries, e.g., TLC, so far only institutional & functional
  - Tools to adjust: less market structure, more conduct
  - More focus on access pricing and policies for market infrastructures (e.g., payments systems)
  - Overall information and technology competition policy
- Countries to give more weight to competition policy
  - Competition policy to be separate from supervision. Better enforcement by effective competition authority
  - Active role of government needed given externalities and coordination issues, e.g., payments system
- Countries commit to pro-competitive framework
  - When credibility at a premium, competition policy authorities weaker, political economy more adverse
  - International agreements (WTO, FTAs) can commit/enforce



# SMEs: Sign, not Cause of a Successful Economy, but Need Finance

- While large SME sector characteristic of successful economies, SMEs do not “cause” growth, nor do SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality
- Rather overall business environment—ease of firm entry and exit, sound property rights, and proper contract enforcement—influences economic growth
- Finance, however, accelerates growth by removing constraints on small firms, more so than for large firms
- Finance allows firms to operate on a larger scale and encourages more efficient asset allocation. Financial and institutional development helps leveling the playing field



# 'Access to finance' recurrent problem for SMEs

- 'Access to finance' for SMEs recurrent problem
  - Anecdotal evidence, analyses and surveys
- Measuring access challenging though
  - Access for whom, for what?
    - What are SMEs, large firms? Trade, project finance, etc..
  - Which aspect of access?
    - Costs, quantity, quality, continuity, types of product, etc.
  - Access vs. usage
    - No demand, even with access
    - Growth opportunities: worse firms to complain most
- Need conceptual framework and measures
  - Econometric analyses or surveys



# Measuring financing constraints (I)

- Investment – cash flow sensitivity
  - Empirical design based on:
    - Tobin's Q-model of investment
    - Euler equation for investment
  - Rigorous approaches, but with strong assumptions and much data needs (e.g., stock prices), not for SMEs
  
- Problems, especially developing countries
  - Classification (constrained or not) often arbitrarily
  - Data not detailed or reliable enough
  - SMEs dominate economic activity, with no/little data




# Measuring financing constraints (II)

- Surveys: ask if financially constrained
  - Especially for SMEs and developing countries surveys only way to get data and access measures
  - Results as expected: larger, older, more export-oriented etc. firms are less financially constrained
- Problems, especially for developing countries
  - Constrained in cost, quantity or quality?
  - Biases: bad firms more likely to report to be financially constrained, good less likely so. Can be "solved" by using control variables, but still limited



# Results from surveys

WBES: Percentage of firms (non-state, non-foreign) that report financing as a major obstacle for their operation and growth



# Who are banked and unbanked firms?

- To the extent known, profiles are as expected
  - Size is important. For large sample of countries, size strongest affects access to credit
    - Size more important compared to performance and other variables, suggesting quantitative limitations to credit access
    - Impact of size on credit is greater for longer terms loans
    - Public financial institutions more likely to lend to large firms
  - Size may reflect not only profitability, financial and legal collateral but also political collateral
  - Indeed, in developed countries size can be overcome
    - Traditionally banks lends to SMEs. Now also larger banks: Wells-Fargo in the US lends to many small, single proprietary firms. Other banks also active





# What constrains SMEs' access?

- SME not served as it is a too high-risk, high-cost proposition for most banks
  - Underserved are new, not experienced in business
  - Even when business is viable, uncertain repayment capacity given volatile income and expenditure
  - High exposure to systemic risks (macro, other)
  - Absence of credit information, lack of collateral, difficulties in contract design and enforcement
  - High transactions costs for small volumes
  - Not conducive interest rates/credit subsidies policies
  - Government interference distorts risk-return signals



# Constraints reflects mismatches of financial products

- Not the right type of financial services provided
  - Lack of products and services: e.g., small borrowers borrow frequently, repay in small installments
  - Small borrowers seek different products, e.g., small savings, lending and insurance (life, health, crop)
  - Transactions costs dealing with formal FIs high: e.g., procedures for opening an account/getting a loan are cumbersome and costly (with high rejection rates)
  - FIs demand collateral, which small borrowers lack
- Not clear what the market failure is, though
  - Why do FIs not offer these products if feasible?




# What is constraining SME access across countries?

- Analysis limited to date, but quality of legal, property rights, information, especially important for small firms
  - Small firms and in countries with poor institutions use less external finance, especially less bank finance
  - Protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms, mainly due to more bank + equity finance
- Substitutes are imperfect, e.g., small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance
- Financial sector development, correlated with these good policies, helps alleviate constraints



# Results from investment – cash flow sensitivity regressions


Using Euler eqs, Love (2003) documents financing constraints



More developed, more liberalized → less constrained firms

# Results from surveys

Greater financial development → fewer constrained firms



Effects are most important beyond certain financial development, as firms then drastically decrease informal finance



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# What other factors constrain SME access to financing?

- Regulations can hinder access
  - Interest rate ceilings, usury laws, restrictions on lending, priority lending
  - Rigidity in chartering, (high) minimum capital adequacy req., limited degrees in funding structures
  - Too heavy regulations and supervision, too strict accounting req., high compliance costs
  - Customer identification (“Know Your Customer”), AML/CFT, other costly rules (e.g., see South Africa)
- But tradeoffs arise
  - Regulations serve other public policy purposes, e.g., stability, integrity, consumer protection



# Better regulatory approaches can be relatively low cost

- Facilitate multiple forms of financial services provision, e.g., not just “banks” but finance, leasing, factoring
- Facilitate specific frameworks for activities of commercial banks on small scale, micro-finance institutions. Yet do not create new and distinct institutional forms unless:
  - Several mature and well-managed organizations are ready to transform into such financial intermediaries
  - Existing institutional forms— such as bank or finance company—are for all practical purposes unusable
- Consider savings separately from credit extension
- Develop anti-predatory lending, rather than usury laws
- Adopt “truth in lending” requirements to small scale
- Educate people/firms on risks of (new) financial services



# Government interventions

- Facilitating credit by public interventions risky
  - Generally distortive, often do not reach intended, e.g.:
    - Subsidies for SME-lending captured by those with already access, middle class, well-connected
    - No additionality of general credit lines on growth
  - Institutional development undermined, banks do not develop credit skills, e.g., development banks' NPLs high
  - Setup subsidies can increase final costs as they lead to too small scale institutions that need to recover fixed costs
    - E.g., subsidies to setting up MFIs can lead to higher spreads
- Case for intervention in credit less clear than other
  - Need to keep the direct and indirect subsidies minimal
  - Costs and risks co-sharing with private sector key





# How to further enhance access?

- Institutional infrastructure improvements, but take time
  - Better legal, information, payments systems, distribution, other
- Public interventions facilitating mainstreaming, scaling up of new initiatives possibly useful, but be careful
  - Can sometimes be done by specific interventions
  - Use existing networks, e.g., postal system to deliver new services by many, private providers (India). Sell postal to private banks (Brazil), better services but risks local monopoly
- New technology and other initiatives can help
  - Mobile banking / broadening range of delivery points
  - Scoring models for SME-lending
  - Pre-paid cards for small transactions
  - Reverse factoring by NAFIN in Mexico using internet platform
- New technology though often needs regulatory changes



# Competition and SME financing

- Improving competition in banking systems
  - Can be done easier, in all segments. Also can provide more (foreign) technology and know how
  - Allow non-bank financial institutions access to existing networks (payments system), especially access to positive and negative credit information (credit bureaus)
- But remains complex, especially in emerging markets
  - How to establish a credible competition agency? Inside or outside supervisory agency. Institutional requirements high
  - Limited data to measure effective competition
  - How to deal with the many network properties in finance?



# Foreign banks enhance access

- Borrower's perceptions across 36 countries
  - Financing obstacles lower in countries with more foreign banks
  - Strong evidence that even small enterprises benefit and no evidence they are harmed by foreign banks
  - Channel is both competition and direct provision of finance
- Latin America study
  - Foreign banks with small local presence not lend much to SMEs
  - But large foreign banks in many cases surpass domestic banks
- Transition economies, with large foreign bank entry
  - Foreign banks lend less to state-owned enterprises. Little evidence that entry leads to cream-skimming, undermining local banks' ability for soft information/relationships lending
  - Evidence that private credit is higher in countries with more foreign presence/entry (yet causality unclear)



# Competition and access

- SME depends on relationships. Competition can:
  - Lower profit: lower access for information-intensive firms
    - Evidence for US/elsewhere: less access with more competition
    - Dynamic effects: bank invest less in information acquisition
  - Lower hold-up problems: lower costs, de- or increase access
    - Evidence: multiple bank relationships lower access
- Technology further complicates, with hard-information ↑
  - Effects of technological innovations, access to information, pattern of entry/exit often ambiguous on competition/access
- Tradeoffs unclear
  - With more competition → more access generally
  - But access to information-intensive firms may suffer



# Competition and SME financing

- Lending towards hard information everywhere
  - While trends appear clear, do not know good or bad, how depends on country circumstances, etc
  - But there may not be an alternative whatsoever
- At the same time banks' comparative advantage is relationships (and risk management)
  - Banks make investments in technology & relationships, based on returns, in turn affecting competition & access
- Banks may well end up doing more relationship-based services (and more risk management)
  - Relationships already cover wide spectrum of services
  - Entry of small banks (in US) specializing in small firms
  - Other forms of financial services for SMEs



# Policy Conclusions

- Competitiveness in financial services
  - Is not about market structure, but ensuring contestability
- Competition policy is lagging in finance
  - More emphasis and new paradigm is needed
- Competitive system is key for SME financing
  - Require basic institutional environment
  - Some specific interventions can help, especially access to information and networks
- Banks will remain major source of SME financing
- Competition has positive and negative effects
  - May lower traditional access forms, yet reduce costs
  - But strengthens returns to banks from relationships across wider spectrum of services
  - Overall effects perhaps unclear, SMEs no choice but adapt



**End of presentation**



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