

When Silicon Valley Meets Wall Street: Why is FinTech overengineered?

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
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When Silicon Valley Meets Wall Street

- ▶ Financial firms pour enormous \$\$ into financial technology
- ▶ 2025 BoA survey: “AI spending has gone *too far*”
 - ▶ *Flash Boys*: same alarm about HFT a decade earlier
- ▶ Pattern repeats across waves — HFT, quant strategies, now AI
 - ▶ Something structural is driving this?

JPMorgan Chase — Annual Technology Budget, 2017-2024



Source: CIO Dive, InvestmentNews, Banking Dive, The Stack | 2018: implied from “~6% increase from 2018” (CIO Dive)

A Boom That Even Insiders Are Questioning

- ▶ **Human capital:** draws a surge in engineering talent
 - ▶ Wall Street now hiring AI engineers at record salaries
- ▶ **Opacity:** *“Major US banks are like a tech company — they build everything from scratch and **keep it secret.**”*
[practitioner interview, JP Morgan]
- ▶ High price volatility, oligopolistic market, ...

The Standard Story

- ▶ **Arms race:** each firm invests because rivals do
 - ▶ Individually rational, collectively wasteful
 - ▶ Classic prisoner's dilemma

	Stay Slow	Go Fast
Stay Slow	$(\$100, \$100)$	$(\$0, \$200 - c)$
Go Fast	$(\$200 - c, \$0)$	$(\$100 - c, \$100 - c)$

What is Missing?

- ▶ **What the standard theory misses:**
 - ▶ Tech is built **in-house** by **engineers** under employment contracts
 - ▶ (Single entity responsible for both trading and engineering)
 - ▶ (Core technology is publicly observable)
- ▶ **New theory built on two overlooked frictions**
 - ▶ **Opacity:** market cannot see the firm's actual technology
 - ▶ **Incentive problems:** engineer bears effort costs; firm can fire

Three Players




- ▶ **Engineer:** develops tech through costly effort
- ▶ **Trading firm:** observes innovation result and *can fire* engineer
- ▶ **Market maker:** *cannot see the technology*
 - ▶ Sets price (provides liquidity) based on **belief** about technology


Engineer: Keep the job, or keep it simple?

- ▶ Engineer: *How much do I need to build to keep my job?*
 - ▶ Developing better technology is personally costly
 - ▶ But must avoid termination
- ▶ With **opaque** tech, answer depends on **market beliefs**

When Market Anticipates Low-level Tech



When Market Anticipates High-level Tech



Same Economy, Two Different Outcomes

- ▶ High- and low-tech eqm arise
 - ▶ Same fundamentals, but **beliefs alone** trigger overengineering
- ▶ Engineer overinvests not for value creation, but **to avoid being fired**
- ▶ **High-tech equilibrium is Pareto inferior**

	Low-Tech World	High-Tech World
Market liquidity	Liquid	Illiquid
Price volatility	Lower	Higher
Firm trading profit	Moderate	Large
Firm/Engineer Welfare	Better off	Worse off
Ordinary investors	Better off	Worse off

What Does This Theory Predict?

- ▶ **High fixed engineer salaries**
 - ▶ Engineer overinvests *knowing its inefficient*
 - ▶ Potentially deviate, but high fixed wage justifies over-engineering
- ▶ **Oligopolistic structure**
 - ▶ Competition compresses firms' trading profits
 - ▶ Engineers face high dismissal risk \Rightarrow innovate more
 - ▶ 'Top 6 HFTs account for 80% of arb. races in LSE' [Budish, 2022]
- ▶ **Non-fin. innovations precede finance overengineering**
 - ▶ ChatGPT shifts *beliefs* about what is feasible in finance
 - ▶ Belief shift alone can tip the system

Fingerprint for Identifying Over-engineering

- ▶ Reaction of **financial market** differs across two equilibria

Reaction to wage shock

Low-Tech World	High-Tech World
↑ Higher engineer salary	↑ Higher engineer salary
↑ → Retention bar rises	↑ → Retention bar rises
↑ → Engineer innovates MORE	↓ → Engineer innovates LESS
↑ → Market LESS liquid	↓ → Market MORE liquid

- ▶ Market reaction reveals which equilibrium we are in
- ▶ Same policy, opposite responses

A New Theory of Financial Over-engineering

- ▶ Not just an arms race; it can arise **within a single firm**
- ▶ Labor market policy **beyond the labor market**:
 - ▶ Wage structure, Non-compete clause enforcement, etc
 - ▶ **Financial market instability and inefficient innovation**
- ▶ Tech booms can be **belief-driven**, not fundamental
 - ▶ Disclosure requirements: shift beliefs, prevent overengineering
- ▶ *The right question is not 'how good is the technology?'*
 - ▶ *but 'which equilibrium are we in?'*