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The Study Group for Internationalization of Capital and Financial Markets in Japan **Recent Developments in Credit Derivatives market and the Challenges for Japan** 

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## Agenda

- Overview of Credit Derivatives
- Motivations for using credit default swaps (CDS) and the Recent Developments
- Challenges for Credit Derivatives Market in Japan



## **Facts about ISDA**

- Incorporated in 1985 with 10 dealer member firms.
- April 2007 membership: Total 789
- Offices
  - New York: Headquarters
  - London: 1996
  - Tokyo & Singapore: 2000
  - Also, Brussels & Washington DC



## **ISDA's Mission**

Primary purpose is to encourage the prudent and efficient development of the privately negotiated derivatives business by:

- Documentation: to promote efficient conduct of the business. Promoting the development of sound risk management practices.
- Fostering high standards of commercial conduct
- Advancing international public understanding of the business
- Educating members and others on key issues affecting them.
- Creating a forum for the analysis and discussion of, and representing the common interest of its members on, these issues and developments.



## **Overview of Credit Derivatives**



#### What are credit derivatives?

- A credit derivative is a privately negotiated, off balance sheet agreement that explicitly transfers credit risk from one party to another.
  - The buyer of credit derivative protection need not own the defaulted asset in order to receive compensation on a credit derivative.
  - The buyer of protection need not suffer an actual loss to receive compensation
- Types of contract
  - Credit default swap
    - Single name
    - Portfolio and index
    - Synthetic securitization
  - Total return swap
  - Credit spread option



## **Credit default swaps**



- Buyer pays premium for protection against default by Reference Entity on specified (notional) amount of exposure
  - Trade confirmation specifies the Reference Entity, the relevant credit events, the underlying notional amount, and the premium paid by the buyer
  - If reference entity defaults or other credit event occurs, seller compensates buyer with default payment equal to net loss
- Notionals are typically USD 10–20 million for investment grade credits



## **Results of hedging with credit default swap**

- Protection buyer (Short credit)
  - Gives up exposure to default of Reference Entity without removing reference asset from balance sheet
    - Also reduces concentration risk
    - Gives up opportunity to profit from taking on credit risk
  - Takes on counterparty credit exposure to protection seller
    - Simultaneous default by Reference Entity and protection seller
    - Default by protection seller only, necessitating replacement of protection
- Protection seller (Long credit)
  - Takes on exposure to Reference Entity without need for funding underlying position
  - Possible counterparty exposure to default by protection buyer if CDS subject to close-out (i.e., loss of remaining premium income)



#### **Credit derivatives market statistics**

#### All credit derivatives (BBA)



#### **Credit default swaps (ISDA)**



- British Bankers' Association (BBA) Credit Derivatives Report 2006
  - Notional principal outstanding for *all credit derivatives* was over \$20 trillion at end of 2005
  - Single name CDS are 33% of market, index/tranche trades are 38%, and basket CDS are 2%
  - Most common term is 5 years, with increasing liquidity in 7 years

#### ISDA Market Survey Year 2006

- Notional principal outstanding of credit default swaps was \$34.5 trillion as of December 31, 2006
- Sample is 90 ISDA primary members (including all major dealers)



# Motivations for using credit default swaps (CDS) and the Recent Developments



## Motivations for using credit default swaps

- Protection buyer (Short position)
  - Hedging credit exposure through short position (previously not feasible)
    - Reducing credit concentration
    - Free up credit lines
  - Acting on a negative credit view
    - Short a credit (not feasible prior to credit derivatives)
    - Buy protection in anticipation of appreciation in price of protection (or deterioration in reference credit)
- Protection seller (Long position)
  - Diversify portfolio by adding desired credits
  - Act on a positive view of a credit (opposite of above)
  - Reduce funding costs (synthetic lending)
- Additional benefits of credit default swaps
  - Transparency: CDS provide a source of credit pricing information
  - Flexibility: CDS make it possible to unbundle credit risks from other risks



## **Increased Flexibility for Banks from CDS**

- Traditionally, banks could only lend and hold.
- With securitization and, in some markets, an increasingly liquid secondary loan market, banks can <u>lend and sell</u>, but this can create relationship issues with the borrower.
- With the development of credit derivatives, banks can now: LEND AND HEDGE



## **Lending and Hedging Interaction**

- Two hypotheses about effect of hedging tools on bank's lending decisions:
  - Banks will, in the aggregate, lend more money
  - Banks will, on balance, lower their credit standards because they know they can lay off the risk through CDS
- Experience has shown that banks will typically lend more by virtue of the ability to hedge credit risk:
  - Frees up lines of credit with valued customers
  - More loans will, most likely, mean more defaults, but not necessarily a higher rate of default.



# Do Banks Lower Lending Standards Because They Can Hedge?

- Suggestion is that banks are less rigorous in their credit review because they know they can lay off the credit risk they have taken on.
- Reality is that credit decisions are far more complex now.
  - Lending decision: all the same considerations apply
  - Hedging decision adds layers of analysis
    - Counterparty risk
    - Price of the hedge--hedge is not without cost
    - Give up any gain from an improving credit
- One credit decision becomes many, making it even more important to get it right.



### **Recent Developments in CDS**

- Operational Issues
  - Confirmation Backlogs
  - Novations
- Settlement Process
  - Movement from physical to cash
- Diversity of Market Participants
  - Hedge funds
  - Asset managers
  - Corporates and individuals?
- Exchange-traded Credit Derivatives





- Market factors
  - Lack of market volatility and liquidity
    - Corporate bonds/loans secondary markets are still at the early stage of development
      - buy and hold investors --- Strategies taken by end-users are biased
      - absence of hedge funds who do short-term trading
  - Credit Spread is too tight
    - No incentive to hedge with credit derivatives



- Regulatory factors
  - Accounting mismatch
    - Loans and lending-related commitments accrual accounting, with credit loss provisioning
    - Derivative hedging instruments Mark-to-market accounting
    - Result is interim earnings volatility that is not reflective of a firm's economic position
  - Regulation to limit big loans to a borrower banks cannot enjoy benefits if hedging with CDS



#### • Banking Practices

- "Overbanking" traditional loan competitions deteriorate the credit spread (→market factor)
- Relationship banking is still dominant in Japanese banks, which tend to tighten the credit spread (→market factor)
- In a traditional banking culture, laying off credit risk that a bank decided to take on tend to be considered "not appropriate"
- Lack of business recognition in trading credit risk



#### • Human resources

- Lack of (or limited number of) specialists in credit market (i.e. Quants, Analysts, Risk Managers)
  - Too quick personnel reshuffle
- Others
  - Systems/infrastructure
  - Lack of client knowledge of the product
  - Complexity of documentation (owing partly to the fact that it is in English)

