Press Conference by Shozaburo Jimi, Minister for Financial Services

(Excerpt)

(Friday, September 10, 2010, from 10:15 a.m. to 11:02 a.m.)

[Questions & Answers]

Q.

There was already an announcement made today, but can you please explain in your own words about the filing for failure received from the Incubator Bank of Japan?

A.

As you just implied in your question, we have already announced the speech of the Minister for Financial Services on this matter and therefore you must know about it, but I would like to give you an account in line with the speech.

Today, the Incubator Bank of Japan, Ltd. filed a statement that it is "unable to make the full payment of its debts with its assets."  As the Bank embarked on its business improvement after becoming subject to a partial business suspension order and a business improvement order dated May 27, it is truly regrettable that things have turned out this way.

In accordance with the Bank's statement thus filed and its financial condition, we just issued today an order that its operations and property be placed under the control of a financial receiver and also appointed the Deposit Insurance Corporation to serve as the financial receiver for the Bank.  The Bank is now slated to strive for an appropriate business operation under the control of the financial receiver, making recourse to the civil rehabilitation procedures along the way.

The deposits with the Incubator Bank of Japan will be protected under the deposit insurance system up to a maximum principal of 10 million yen, plus its interest, per depositor.  For the deposits protected by the deposit insurance system, the plan is to make arrangements so that the payback can be started shortly after the beginning of the next week.  As those deposits are protected irrespective of the timing of the payback, we would like to ask depositors to act calmly.  The portion of a principal in excess of 10 million yen and its interest per depositor will become payable according to the asset condition of the Bank and is, from a viewpoint of ensuring convenience for depositors, scheduled to be paid back before long at an estimated proceeds payment rate under the estimated proceeds payment program of the Deposit Insurance Corporation.

As for the lending business of the Incubator Bank of Japan, we have requested the financial receiver to ensure attentive steps when dealing with loans for bona fide and sound borrowers.  Additionally, relevant organizations will also be requested to take thorough steps for the facilitation of credit.  Users are kindly advised not to worry and to respond in a calm fashion.

In recent years, the Incubator Bank of Japan operated under a singular business model of increasingly purchasing loan claims from money lending businesses and rapidly expanding business with major borrowers with which it had a close relationship and, as a result of its failure to perform adequate credit checks and credit management in line with such a business model, the Bank was faced with the need to set aside a large amount of additional reserves.  We suspect that the main reason for the Bank's failure is the history of its operation like that.  Another point is that because the bank does not offer an ordinary deposit service and therefore does not have any clearing function, and also does not raise funds from the interbank market, it does not share the same type of business operation as other financial institutions and is accordingly, in our view, situated in an environment distinct from those of other financial institutions.  Judging from those circumstances of the bank, we believe that its failure will not affect the stability of Japan's financial system.

That is all.

Please proceed with questions.

Q.

This will likely be the first case to tap the so-called payoff program in which only a maximum principal of 10 million yen, plus its interest, is protected per depositor.  While the case of the Incubator Bank of Japan supposedly is based on singular circumstances, how do you view the impact that the first use of the payoff program may have on other financial institutions, including regional banks, shinkin banks and credit associations?

A.

We had a recent case where, in November 2003, it was found as a result of the deliberations by the Financial Crisis Response Council with respect to the Ashikaga Bank, as you know, that serious problems might arise in the maintenance of stability of the financial system of Japan or a particular region.  In this case involving the Ashikaga Bank, the scheme for special crisis management was implemented, also under the Deposit Insurance Act, and all deposits were protected in full as a result.  The total amount of deposits was, if my memory is correct, 4 trillion yen in the case of the Ashikaga Bank, while it is 400 billion yen - one tenth, that is - in the case before us of the Incubator Bank.  In that sense, what caused the failure of the Incubator Bank of Japan is the very skewed makeup of the borrowers of the bank, as I have just mentioned.  While the total deposits (of the Incubator Bank of Japan) amount to a little more than 400 billion yen and consist of approximately 29,000 accounts, over 80 percent of them, or approximately 350 billion yen, were concentrated with 120 companies belonging to its network of relationships, as it were.  Its purchases of loan claims from money lending businesses in recent years were also among the causes, as you must know well.  Additionally, the Bank allegedly purchased claims from businesses like SFCG, which was formerly known as Shoko Fund.  Furthermore, as the Incubator Bank of Japan does not offer an ordinary deposit service and its deposits are all term deposits, it does not have a clearing function.  It is in that sense that I said that it was a bank operating under a very singular business model.  How the system to resolve a failure case in Japan works is that the full deposit protection applies in a failure involving a very significant systemic risk, as in the case of the Ashikaga Bank that I have just referred to, while the flat amount coverage, which is more like a general rule, applies to other cases. Accordingly, we have decided to apply to the case before us, of the Incubator Bank, what is called the financial assistance method.  I am hoping that those points will be well understood.

According to a report that I have received, there are over 110,000 depositors, of which roughly 3 percent have more than 10 million yen and 1 percent have more than 11 million yen in deposit.  While I find it truly regrettable for those depositors, this is basically how the banking system works after all and the flat amount coverage is indeed a basic rule that applies for the purpose of financial institution failure resolution.  As full coverage is therefore rather an exception, we took into consideration various circumstances that I have just referred to, and reached a judgment that it is more appropriate to apply the general rule fairly and squarely.

As for the second part of your question concerning the impact on regional banks and shinkin banks, I am convinced that there will be none.  This is because the failure of the Incubator Bank of Japan resulted from its very peculiar operation, as I have just taken a fair bit of time to explain.  I am accordingly convinced that this will not affect regional banks and others, including shinkin banks.

Q.

Please tell us about the current state of the Incubator Bank of Japan, for example, its financial condition and, while the Financial Services Agency (FSA) has thus far appointed the Deposit Insurance Corporation to serve as the financial receiver and issued a business suspension order, I would also like you to please explain further actions that the FSA is planning to take today or in a day or two, if any.

A.

Senior Vice Minister Otsuka will give you an explanation.

Senior Vice Minister:

Let me answer this one as it relates to factual matters.

According to the information that we have been able to confirm thus far, the size of insolvency is 187 billion yen. We had taken a number of steps in response to the series of occurrences and, today, we took to issuing a business suspension order and the bank, now under the control of a financial receiver, is poised to file for proceedings under the Civil Rehabilitation Act, etc. and resume its operations on Monday under new management. In all likelihood, the FSA will initially just wait and see how this process of reorganization under the control of the financial receiver will turn out.

Q.

I am Namikawa from Toyo Keizai.

The bank was subjected to a partial business suspension order in May and it is now September when we see this series of actions being taken, which means that there were several months in between.  Can I take it that it is the FSA which is to check any changes in the deposit status to ensure trust in the payoff program, including whether or not there have been any account closures, for example, closures of any large accounts?  Or is that going to be the job of the Deposit Insurance Corporation?

Senior Vice Minister:

The answer I am giving now is given from a perspective of factual matters and practical developments leading up to now. We do have a full understanding of the outflows of the bank's deposits all the way up until today. The fact, however, is that there has been no notable outflow of deposits since May 27, the day of the business improvement order, or June 28, the day the bank announced its business improvement plan. In that sense, I do not think that trust in the payoff program will be compromised by the developments since the May 27 business improvement order.

Q.

The bank has filed for civil rehabilitation proceedings.  This is then to be followed by procedures in accordance with Article 74, paragraph 5 of the Deposit Insurance Act, which means that the bank took recourse to civil rehabilitation proceedings first.  While, as a general rule, the Civil Rehabilitation Act supposedly does not absolutely require that the management should be replaced, what is the treatment under the Deposit Insurance Act like?

Senior Vice Minister:

There seems to be some misunderstanding of the facts.  The bank filed a statement under Article 74, paragraph 5 that it "is unable to make the full payment of debts with assets" and we took to ordering that its operations and property be placed under the control of a financial receiver in accordance with Article 74, paragraph 1, and what is expected to happen now is that the bank, which is under the control of a financial receiver or its new management, will file for proceedings under the Civil Rehabilitation Act today.

Q.

If that is the case, Senior Vice Minister, what will happen to the management - I mean the one that was at the helm up until now - from next week on?

Senior Vice Minister:

The answer is that the management has now, as we speak, been replaced by the Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Q.

If that is the case, will the four or five external directors who were running its management board all resign then?

Senior Vice Minister:

As the board already lost control of the bank's operations when the bank accepted the order, I presume that it will be up to the Incubator Bank of Japan to decide how those people should be treated.

Q.

With the first use of the payoff program now imminent, which will entail the partial reduction of deposits to be paid back, is there any issue or point to look back at concerning your supervision hitherto?

Also, seeing as the bank was known to be contemplating boosting its capital and there is still some time left before the interim financial closing at the end of September, can you please let us know the reason why and how the whole procedures are taking place at this time?

A.

 In working on the supervision of financial institutions, the financial authorities have taken strict and appropriate actions as necessary in accordance with the nature of business as checked and with applicable laws and regulations, whenever a statutory violation or an issue concerning user protection was detected in the course of an on-site inspection or daily inspection, etc.  That was also the case with the Incubator Bank of Japan, which, as you know, has a history of committing the obstruction of an inspection.  As far as I see, we have overcome difficulties like that and have been working on delivering rigorous supervision as we should.

Senior Vice Minister:

Allow me to add a few more words - on the subject of the bank's attempt to find new investors, there was a statement in the document submitted by the bank today, which was so submitted in accordance with a request to submit a status report under Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Banking Act, that the bank was trying to find investors but there has been no prospective investor thus far that meets the capitalization requirements.  To be precise, quote, assuming that the Deposit Insurance Act would not apply, there is no prospective investor thus far that has expressed an intention to invest in our bank - the Incubator Bank of Japan, that is - to an extent enough to resolve our insolvency; there is also no expectation that we should in the future be able to receive an offer for investment sufficient to resolve our insolvency without the application of the Deposit Insurance Act, end quote.  What has happened today happened as a result of the bank having filed such a statement.

A.

Which is a judgment that the Board of Directors of the Incubator Bank of Japan has made.

Q.

I know about the development in which the obstruction of an inspection took place during last year's inspection and you have also pointed out as a cause of the bank's failure that it was "increasing purchased loan claims from money lending businesses in recent years."  I therefore assume that such a shift in the bank's business approach had already taken place before the recent inspection began, like in or around 2007 - may I ask if there is any point to look back at concerning your supervision in the course of that development?

A.

I believe that it has already been announced that the FSA conducted its first inspection in 2005, the second in 2007 and another one in May 2009, according to the administrative authorities.  I hear that the bank was quite uncooperative in the inspections during the period between 2007 and 2009.  Before that period, although the bank was not doing very well under the business model that it was then applying, I judge from my common sense as a politician that it was nevertheless toiling away in an honest and diligent fashion.  From 2007 to 2009, however, the bank rapidly drifted into purchasing loan claims from money lending businesses or focusing on a certain set of companies belonging to its network of relationships, to the point of concentrating over 80 percent of its lending on them.  In the light of that fact, I basically believe that this case did involve circumstances very different from those of normal banks, circumstances that are quite singular and are specific to the bank.

Q.

In connection with the previous question, the bank's financial results showed a very irregular pattern in which its deficit, which was only 5.1 billion yen for the period ending March 2010, marked a whopping 187 billion yen for the period ending in June.  What is your recognition of the supervision and inspection issue that the FSA left such financial management unaddressed?

I would also like to ask how you are intending to hold the former management accountable for their corporate management.

A.

First, what I just said about the Incubator Bank of Japan may have sounded a bit like an inside story, but it is based on the findings of our work - we examined the bank's corporate management structure and the status of its risk management system development through noncompulsory hearings, orders to submit a report, on-site inspections and other means to look into its business of purchasing loan claims from money lending businesses, which suddenly picked up in and after 2008, and of making large loans, which started showing a remarkable increase in 2009.  As, in so doing, we detected a serious problem with respect to its credit risk management system concerning major borrowers and its loan claim purchase business in the results of our on-site inspection that was begun in June 2009, we recently issued a business suspension order and business improvement order on May 27 to show it a direction.  My guess is that following the subsequent replacement of the bank's management, which you surely know about, the results of reassessment conducted by the new management concerning those major borrowers led to the significant change in numbers.

Q.

Even so, how do you see the fact that the FSA let it suffice with the management replacement only, thus leaving such significant deterioration of its financial condition unaddressed?

A.

On the subject of holding them accountable, while I find it truly regrettable that the Incubator Bank of Japan ended up failing, I expect criminal and civil proceedings to follow according to the letter of the law, as you know, in order that future investigations by the financial receiver should lead to the clarification of the responsibility of the management and others for the bank's failure.  I might add that presumably, even after the operation of the financial institution under receivership is transferred or even while it is placed under the control of the Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC), necessary steps will be taken for prosecution purposes if any criminal act is found to have been involved.

As for the responsibility of the Minister, I find it extremely regrettable that the Incubator Bank of Japan has arrived at the situation that it is in now.  The financial authorities have striven to deliver rigorous supervision on the basis of the facts confirmed with respect to the Incubator Bank of Japan and in accordance with law, and I also expect that the former management will be held accountable in the future for both criminal or civil wrongs according to the letter of the law and directions of the financial receiver.

The FSA is also committed to continuing to work hard on stability of the financial system, applying the lesson that we have learned from this experience.

Q.

You said that the deposit paybacks will hopefully be started "shortly after the beginning of the next week" - can you please tell us, to the extent that you know for now, about any prospective changes and when we can know when the paybacks will become available?

Senior Vice Minister:

I will take this question. Those who have 10 million yen or less in deposit can receive the payback as a regular transaction as of the beginning of next week. For those with more than 10 million yen, the payback will start as soon as the bank's credit and debt picture can be confirmed, a process that will likely take roughly several months. If a depositor wants an earlier payback, there is a system called estimated proceeds payment whereby the payment can be accelerated a little by applying an estimated proceeds payment rate.

Q.

Does that mean that the portions covered by the Deposit Insurance Act can be paid back as of Monday?

Senior Vice Minister:

Yes, that is correct.

Q.

When you were talking about the bank's capitalization attempt earlier, you said that there is nobody willing to take it on unless on the assumption that the Deposit Insurance Act be applied.  Does that then conversely mean that there was an investor who was positive about taking a stake in the Incubator Bank but only if and after the payoff program is tapped under the Deposit Insurance Act?

Senior Vice Minister:

No, that is not within our knowledge.  Generally speaking, though, reorganization procedures will be carried out under a financial receiver - this time, the Deposit Insurance Corporation - within the set framework and eventually there can be an offer to take over the failed institution.  Accordingly, work is about to start indeed on the assumption that there should be a prospective investor who will come forward when the time comes.

Q.

I am Minoru Sasaki, a freelance journalist.

Here we have a specious story to explain this case of the Incubator Bank, that it went quickly downhill after embarking on the business of purchasing loan claims but, in my view, there must have always been problems with the bank ever since its founding, judging from the resignation after resignation of its management team members or from the case where financing was provided to a company run by a family member of Mr. Kimura (the former Chairman).  In that sense, this case seems to me to represent a major fiasco of financial administration and, when I asked Minister Jimi at the last press conference about the fact that Mr. Kimura was engaged in a consulting business offering advice on banking license acquisition by charging 105 million yen in consultation fees when he was an incumbent advisor (to the FSA), the Minister said that as the prohibition against concurrent office holding does not apply to an advisor, it is not controversial in that respect.  I have been constantly bringing up this point since the days of former Minister Yosano when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in power and, considering that Minister Jimi did point out distortions caused by the Koizumi reform after the recent change of administration and I am sure that Senior Vice Minister Otsuka, being a financial expert, must naturally be so versed in this matter that I should not have to give any detailed account, why has there been no inspection that covers people involved all the way from the day the license of the Incubator Bank was issued?  I just cannot stop wondering about this question and would like to have it answered by the Senior Vice Minister as well.

Senior Vice Minister:

Let me reply first, and the Minister will then give a comment. I understand that a variety of issues lingering since the founding of the bank - the kinds that you have just described - have indeed been brought up for quite some time. As we ourselves were in opposition when the bank was founded, the fact is that we have also found some of the developments associated with its founding to be highly questionable. What we found from our inquiry into factual matters from that standpoint revealed this development: this Mr. Kimura served as an advisor to the FSA from October 3, 2002 to August 20, 2003 and, on the very day he resigned from the advisor's post, he applied for a preliminary examination for the founding of the bank, and the examination took place formally in the same fashion as any other regular examination associated with banking licensing, followed by the official application for license on March 15, 2004 and the acquisition of the license on April 13, 2004.

Therefore, as the Minister has stated before and will presumably also comment right after me today, the answer to the question as to the legality of Mr. Kimura's act is that it was legally permissible, because he was in the post of advisor to which the prohibition against holding concurrent positions under the National Public Service Act does not apply, and that is a confirmed answer.

That said, there may admittedly be a range of views regarding the ethicality of his act. Back then, the incumbent Minister for Financial Services was former Minister Takenaka and the Commissioner was former Commissioner Takagi, and I think that the point you just raised may emerge as an issue again later on, depending on how an array of civil and criminal responsibilities will be pursued.

A.

I basically concur with what Senior Vice Minister Otsuka has just said.  As you know, given the fact that Mr. Heizo Takenaka was the Minister for Financial Services in the Koizumi administration and (former) Chairman Kimura served as an advisor then, and the establishment of the Incubator Bank also took place under Minister Heizo Takenaka, an array of criminal and civil responsibilities will be addressed in accordance with law, as has just been explained.  All things considered, I do think that as a politician, the then Minister for Financial Services will have no choice but to face his moral responsibility.  The bank being a bank, it has public aspects and carries a public interest.  As trust forms the basis of the banking business as a matter of fact and I therefore believe that, as Senior Vice Minister Otsuka just pointed out, the moral responsibility question cannot be avoided from the viewpoint of trust, we are hoping to take proper and appropriate steps to address it.

Q.

Having also heard that after Mr. Kimura resigned the advisor's post, staff of Mr. Kimura's company paid almost daily visits to the section responsible for licensing administration, I would sum up that in the current situation, facts surrounding the case, including that development, remain not so clear to outside observers.  Therefore, if you so direct formally, wouldn't it be possible to have all those matters inspected apart from the statutory violation?

A.

 Now that the bank actually failed, criminal and civil responsibilities can be pursed, and we would also like to take appropriate steps, putting into perspective what we have just stated.  Considering that the Banking Act has a clear provision that the financial business and banks carry public interests and have public aspects and, in my view, the financial business is founded on relationships of trust and a sound or robust financial business is naturally necessary for any sustainable company or economy, we are hoping to take actions in those lights, taking into account all the comments that you have just made.

Q.

My name is Suda and I am a freelancer.  It seems to me that the FSA adhered to the so-called Friday-to-Monday preparation approach in dealing with failed institutions in the past, particularly with respect to the payoff program, but today's event apparently came one business day earlier than otherwise expected.  Why was it early this morning that you issued a business suspension order?

Senior Vice Minister:

I take this question as it relates to a factual matter. What happened today was based strictly on the intention of the Incubator Bank of Japan, which held a Board of Directors meeting from 6:02 a.m. today and proceeded to submit an Article 24 report and file an Article 74 statement upon conclusion of their meeting. What is commonly called the Friday-to-Monday preparation approach thus did not follow this time and the preparations began on Friday morning instead - that is how I recognize the situation.

Q.

So, the FSA had no involvement in the formation of this timeline?

Senior Vice Minister:

That is correct, no involvement.

Q.

Let me verify once again the statement that you have just made.

First, when the Incubator Bank was founded, the incumbent Minister and Commissioner for the FSA were Mr. Takenaka and Mr. Takagi, respectively.  Judging from your remark that, depending on the situation, civil and criminal responsibilities may be pursued in the future, can I take it that your future action may possibly be to take those two to court?

Senior Vice Minister:

Well, no, I guess that the meaning did not get delivered quite correctly. The civil or criminal responsibilities being referred to are associated with criminal procedures with respect to the bank's failure and Mr. Kimura and others who have already been arrested, and the point that the Minister made was that, apart from those issues, he would like to examine the entirety of the case by putting into perspective the moral responsibility question as well. Therefore, the reference to civil and criminal aspects and the one to the moral responsibility of Mr. Takenaka, etc. are not mutually connected.

A.

I presume that the cause and other matters leading up to the failure of the bank will be investigated by the financial receiver according to the financial institution failure legislation, while, for the time being, the moral responsibility issue must be examined separately from the criminal and civil responsibility issue, for which there are institutional proceedings.

Being the minister responsible for financial service of a country, however, I am intending to put the moral responsibility issue properly into perspective as well.

Q.

I would like to double-check the numbers - please give us the total amount of deposits, the number of depositors and the number of accounts covered by the payoff program in this case, as well as the amount that may not be eligible for paybacks.

I would also like to ask the Minister about the payback procedure scheduled to be implemented squarely starting next week - can you please tell us what prospect or view you have as to whether or not they (the Incubator Bank of Japan) are going to operate solemnly as they should?

Senior Vice Minister:

Let me give you the numbers first.

As of the end of August, the total amount of deposits is 585.9 billion yen and the number of depositors is 113,000. Of those, the amount of the deposits in excess of 10 million yen is 47.1 billion yen, which belongs to 3,560 people. For your additional information, the deposits in excess of 11 million yen total to 23.4 billion yen and are held by 1,233 people, which means that the difference is approximately 24 billion yen and that there are roughly 2,300 people who have 10 million to 11 million yen in deposit.

A.

As for your question about the prospect for the procedure to begin after the weekend, the fact is that it was this morning that the Incubator Bank of Japan held a Board of Directors meeting, made the decision that has been described, and filed a report to the FSA.  I have been informed that the bank's staff reported to work this morning and there has been no significant confusion thus far.  As Japan boasts the world's most developed financial institution failure legislation, I am hoping that the operation will proceed in a tranquil fashion and that is what I mean by my request to act calmly.  Just before I came here, I received a report from the field, indicating that their operation is underway in a highly tranquil fashion.

Q.

Can I take it that there is no situation that has the appearance of what is called a bank run?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

With the bank poised to be eventually transferred to an acquirer bank, do you have any target of a sort in mind?  Also, in how long a period do you expect it to be finally transferred to an acquirer bank?

One more thing is about the "moral responsibility," which is very abstract and hard to grasp. Seeing as you say that there is no problem legally, are you implying by referring to the moral responsibility that although there is no statutory violation found, you find something obscure in that there is an inkling of leniency in the issuance of the license? Or are you saying that once a minister licenses a bank, he should be morally responsible for its failure as well? Or do you have an issue with the fact that the license was issued for someone who was very close to the authorities, as it were, as an advisor? Or is it something else that you mean by the "moral" - can you please elaborate a little more?

A.

Your question strikes me as very much to the point.  I believe that back in those days, the FSA also issued a banking license to banks other than the Incubator Bank of Japan, including Seven Bank and Sony Bank, and I have received a report stating that the processing time and other details in the Incubator Bank's case were not so different compared to those other cases.  Still, considering that it is a case involving someone who was an advisor to the FSA - though he supposedly applied for the license after he resigned from that post - it evokes the saying "Suspicious haunts the guilty mind."  As Mr. Heizo Takenaka was also a Diet member in addition to being a minister, I am of the opinion that the moral question should still be pursued in a proper fashion in dealing with this case.

Q.

How about the acquirer issue?

Senior Vice Minister:

An acquirer institution, you mean?

A.

Is there any target in mind?

Q.

It is the issue of a bridge bank, I assume.

Senior Vice Minister:

It is still up in the air now.

Q.

Do you have any target in mind as to in how long a time you can find one?

Senior Vice Minister: As I have just mentioned, our guess is in several months.  As, however, the bridge bank itself can legally exist for two years as a general rule and up to three years including an optional extension of one year, an acquirer financial institution, or the final transferee, is to be found in those three years, which effectively makes the deadline three years.

A.

From what I heard, no decision has been made thus far as to the final acquirer financial institution selection.

Senior Vice Minister:

Let me correct one factual matter concerning a previous question about the numbers.  I said that the total amount of deposits exceeding 11 million yen is 23.4 billion yen and the number of such depositors is 1,233.  Those people have more than 11 million yen in deposit but they are protected up to 10 million yen, which means that the overflow portion in excess of the 10 million yen amounts to approximately 10 billion yen of the 47.1 billion yen that I referred to.  That is the only information I would like to add.

Q.

I am Takahashi, a freelance journalist.  Can I take it that the number of depositors and other information that have just been reported are based on numbers after the name-based aggregation?  I came across some information suggesting that the Incubator Bank of Japan was attracting large amounts of deposits through accountholder name diversification - what was the truth behind stories like that?  Can I also assume that there should be no issue involved in the name-based aggregation?

Senior Vice Minister:

As the work of name-based aggregation by the Deposit Insurance Corporation is to begin as of today, it is possible that some numbers may change as a result of those validation procedures.

(End)